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Creation, evolution etc.… theoretical and interdisciplinary perspectives on the 
interpretation of the Court of Justice of the European Union  
 
Introduction 
	  
Is [Article 34 TFEU] …, to be interpreted as meaning… ? 
 
(Case C-171/11 Fra.bo [2012] ECR I-0000) 
 
This preliminary reference question of the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf in Fra.bo is as typical 
as it is revealing. Typical, as an imprecise empirical glance at the development of the 
jurisprudence of the Court reveals that the form of the question – is such and such a provision of 
EU law to be interpreted as meaning so and so – has become standardized. Revealing, as it 
shows interpretation to be at the very heart of the Court’s activities – indeed it is its institutional 
task – and that this is recognized and acknowledged by other actors such as national courts.  
The central nature of interpretation and how crucial it is to understanding EU law, or any law for 
that matter, is not something that has passed by the judges or Advocates General of the Court. 
Indeed many, if not most, of the rich literature on the interpretation of the Court has been written 
by those charged with its performance. My purpose is not to rehash what has preceded, although 
it is of undoubted importance in describing the Court’s interpretation, not least because it reveals 
the phenomenology of the interpreter. 
Instead, my purpose is to infuse the description of the methods of interpretation of the Court – 
textual, contextual, and teleological – with theoretical and interdisciplinary perspectives and in 
doing so add depth to it. Interpretive theory is naturally of primary importance. I draw on the 
philosopher and great Oxford positivist Raz to describe the creativity involved in the interpretive 
process. I make use of the hermeneutic theory of Gademer as adapted for legal interpretation by 
Esser. Along with systems theory as developed by Luhmann and economic approaches, 
hermeneutics is deployed to describe the evolutionary nature of the Court’s interpretation. As 
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already stated, a critical – and perhaps unavoidable perspective – is that of describing how 
interpreters experience the legal issues they face. In this regard, I draw on the Critical Legal 
Studies tradition. Legal and integrationist theories are (again naturally) of prime importance, as 
is moral and political philosophy. 
As is evident, there is no one guiding theoretical approach. Instead, I have chosen the 
perspectives that seem apt or which shed light on a particular phenomenon in the interpretation 
of the Court. However, I hope that analytical linkages between the various perspectives become 
apparent, as well as with interpretation of the Court. Moreover, I hope the theoretical 
perspectives aid in clarifying, at least at a conceptual level, the relationship between the 
interpretive methods deployed by the Court.  
The thesis culminates in section IV where, based on these perspective, I argue that the meta-
teleology of the Court – the cornerstone that guides and justifies all other interpretive methods – 
is today best recast in terms of providing individuals with an autonomy-supporting pan-European 
environment aimed at cross-border action, interaction and thus ultimately integration. There is of 
course a danger here of flirting with idealism, which would be inappropriate in a descriptive 
account. However, even if I am partial to the ideal, my argument is that it is an ideal that is 
shared by the Court.  
If the approach to the topic is unorthodox, the structure of the description is not. I begin outlining 
interpretation as the institutional task of the Court. I then move on to examine textual, contextual 
and teleological interpretation in turn.  
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I. Interpreting EU law as the institutional task of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union 
	  
According to Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (the Court) ‘shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties 
the law is observed’. ‘The Court’s primary task, its chief raison d’être,’ wrote Chevalier in the 
early and revolutionary period of the Court’s life, ‘is thus the direct or indirect interpretation of 
the texts of [Union] law’1.  
However, unlike with the Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter)2, neither the TEU nor the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contain a provision on their 
interpretation. The starting point the Court took in Van Gend en Loos to fill in this foundational 
lacuna (and indeed provide for the method for determining what are underdetermined Treaties) 
was unremarkable in the sense that it relied on methods of interpretation common to the legal 
orders of the Member States – particularly the French and German legal traditions – and 
international law3: the Court must consider ‘the spirit, the general scheme, and the wording of… 
provisions’4 – what may be termed as literal, contextual and teleological interpretation (each will 
be elaborated upon in sections II-IV below). The Court restated its interpretive technique in 
CILFIT, bringing it line with Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties: 
‘every provision of [EU] law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of EU law 
as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on 
which the provision in question is to be applied’5. The Court did so in Van Gend en Loos with 
regard to the EEC Treaty and the result of this was remarkable, particularly in terms of 
objectives6: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 R.-M. Chevallier, ‘Methods and Reasoning of the European Court in Its Interpretation of Community Law’  
(1965) 2 Common Market Law Review 21, 21 
2 See Article 52 of the Charter  
3Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties states that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its 
object and purpose’. 
4 Case 26/62 van Gend end Loos [1963] ECR 1 (English special edition), 12 
5 Case 283/81 CILFIT e. a. [1982] ECR 3415, paragraph 18 
6 van Gen end Loos, above n 4, 12  
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The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common market, the functioning of 
which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty is more 
than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states. This 
view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to 
peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions endowed with 
sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member States and also their citizens. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that the nationals of the States brought together in the Community 
are called upon to cooperate in the functioning of this Community through the intermediary of 
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. 
In addition the task assigned to the Court of Justice under Article 177, the object of which is to 
secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by national courts and tribunals, confirms that the 
states have acknowledged that Community law has an authority which can be invoked by their 
nationals before those courts and tribunals. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit 
within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only 
imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become 
part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the 
Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon 
individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community. 
 
This provides the starting point for the Court’s interpretation in the following senses. First, it 
settles a direct7 or important indirect objective of the provisions of the Treaties8 – the 
establishment of what is today termed the internal market, through it an increased individual 
(economic9) space for action, and consequent inter-Member State interaction and integration (see 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Such as the with regard to the fundamental freedoms, and to an extent, Citizenship (Articles 21, 34, 45, 49, 56 and 
63 TFEU) 
8 Such as the preliminary reference mechanism as is posited in Article 267 TFEU.  
9 Today, Citizenship can be said to be an extent severed from this original economic rationale, although it is often 
not far from the surface. For example in case C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-6241, at paragraph 68, a case which 
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section I.B and IV below). Establishing an internal market cannot be said today to be the sole 
sub-objective the EU Treaties. However, it remains a very important, if not core, sub-objective in 
the grand project of European integration10.  
Second, it establishes the autonomy of the EU legal order necessary for it to achieve its 
objectives11. This was confirmed by the Court in Costa v ENEL where it formulated its primacy 
doctrine: ‘the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which, on entry into force of the 
Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts 
are bound to apply’12.  
Third, it establishes the importance of the preliminary ruling procedure (see section I.A below).  
Fourth, it provides for a vision of the legal system required to achieve the Treaty objectives – a 
system of protected rights (see section I.C below).  
It is in these ways that the Court in Van Gend en Loos crossed the Rubicon13 and why it is 
‘difficult to exaggerate the importance’14 of the judgement, a point repeatedly underlined at a 
conference to mark the 50th anniversary of the judgement at the Court of Justice in 201315.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
concerned the derivative right of residence of a third country national family member whose entry to the Member 
State of origin was unlawful, the Court reasoned that not allowing that third country national a right of residence 
‘would not be compatible with the objective set out in Article 3(1)(c) EC of an internal market characterised by the 
abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of persons. Establishing an internal market 
implies that the conditions of entry and residence of a Union citizen in a Member State whose nationality he does 
not possess are the same in all the Member States. Freedom of movement for Union citizens must therefore be 
interpreted as the right to leave any Member State, in particular the Member State whose nationality the Union 
citizen possesses, in order to become established under the same conditions in any Member State other than the 
Member State whose nationality the Union citizen possesses.’ 
10 See section I.B and III 
11 Confirmed in the more recent high-profile Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat  
International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, at paragraph 285, where the constitutional 
autonomy of EU law was under threat from norms of international law, where the Court declared that ‘the 
obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles 
of the EC Treaty, which include the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental rights, that respect 
constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is for the Court to review in the framework of the complete 
system of legal remedies established by the Treaty.’ 
12Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 593 
13 N. Fennelly, ‘Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice’ (1996) 20 Fordham International Law 
Journal 656, 679 
14 Ibid. 
15 < http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-02/programme_vgl_en.pdf>, accessed 22 August 
2014  
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Taking into account these features specific to the EU context, the Court is required to develop 
the law because of the underdetermined nature of the Treaties and is given the institutional 
capacity – bestowed upon it by the preliminary ruling procedure – to do so (A). The Court uses 
this capacity to creatively make more precise and evolve EU law within the context of the project 
and purpose of integration (B). The result of this precision and evolution of EU law is a system 
of rights, and protection of those rights, which protect the individual and allows for the 
achievement of the aim of integration (C).   
 
A. The normative system that requires the Court to develop the law and the institutional 
system which gives the Court the capacity to do so 
	  
The Treaties for the most part16 lay down objectives rather than formulate substantive rules. Lord 
Denning MR, writing from the perspective of an English judge shortly after the United Kingdom 
acceded to the EU, observed that ‘[t]he Treaty is quite unlike any of the enactments to which we 
have become accustomed [in the United Kingdom]. The draftsmen of our statutes have striven to 
express themselves with the utmost exactness. They have tried to foresee all possible 
circumstances that may arise and to provide for them… How different is this Treaty! It lays 
down general principles. It expresses its aims and purposes. All in sentences of moderate length 
and commendable style. But it lacks precision. It uses words and phrases without defining what 
they mean. An English lawyer would look for an interpretation clause, but he would look in vain. 
There is none. All the way through the Treaty there are gaps and lacunae. These have to be filled 
in by the judges, or by Regulations or directives. It is the European way.’17 
This underdetermined nature is in a large part what gives rise to the need to interpret the Treaties. 
Instead of being a fully worked out set of substantive rules, the Treaties instead amount to, in the 
word of Pescatore, former judge of the Court, ‘acts of mutual confidence’18. Put another way, and 
thinking schematically, the Treaties, as a ‘traité cadre’19, ‘provide no more than a framework’20. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 With the notable exception of the competition provisions.  
17 Bulmer Ltd v Bollinger SA [1974] Ch 401, 425 
18 P. Pescatore, The Law of Integration (1st edition, Kluwer Law International, 1975) 19 
19 J. Mertens de Wilmars, ‘Réflexions sur les méthodes d’interprétation de la Cour de justice des Communautés  
européennes ’ (1986) Cahiers de droit européen 5, 13 
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They posit – what were at least originally for the mainly – wide economic concepts which are 
filled out and made more concrete by the Court. For example, the Court added definition to the 
concept of a concerted practice21 in Suike Unie by stating that it was ‘a form of coordination 
between undertakings, which, without having been taken to the stage where an agreement 
properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes for the risks of competition, 
practical cooperation between them which leads to conditions of competition which do not 
correspond to the normal conditions of the market’22. Likewise, a measure of equivalent effect23 
was said by the Court in Dassonville to include ‘all trading rules enacted by Member States 
which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community 
trade’24. As such, the Court is engaged in a process of defining the scope and application of wide 
concepts and rules.  
Given this objective-based and undetermined nature of the Treaties, if they were to be at all 
functional, they required a mechanism by which substantive rules could be generated from the 
Treaty objectives. The preliminary ruling procedure is the key mechanism that gives the Court 
the capacity to do so.  In this regard, Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) states that the Court ‘shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union…’. Likewise, Article 19(3)(b) TEU states 
that the Court ‘shall, in accordance with the Treaties:... give preliminary rulings, at the request of 
courts or tribunals of the Member States, on the interpretation of Union law’.   
Three important features may be noted about this mechanism.  
The first, and most important for the present purpose, is that the Article 267 TFEU mechanism 
ensures the uniform interpretation and application of Union law throughout the Union. As will be 
further developed in sections II-IV below with regard to the interpretive methods of the Court, a 
uniform interpretation of EU law across the Member States is crucial to the project and purpose 
of the Union, integration; particularly with regard to its core sub-project, the internal market. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2006) 18 
21 Contained in Article 101 TFEU 
22 Case C-40/73 Suike Unie [1975] ECR 1663, paragraph 26 
23 Contained in Article 34 TFEU 
24 Case C-8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5 
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This means that the prominent role the Court plays through the interpretation of EU law – in 
providing uniform interpretations, to create what has been described by Advocate General 
Fennelly writing extra-judicially as ‘a monopoly on final interpretation’25 – is itself the result of 
its use of its interpretive methods – particularly its recourse to context and objectives. In other 
words, in order to realise the substantive goals, a procedural architecture – an institutional system 
– was put in place.  
This uniformity in interpretation also aids the Court in fulfilling its Article 19 TEU mission of 
ensuring ‘that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law [emphasis added] is 
observed’. The requirement of the Court to ensure observance of the law places an obligation on 
the Court to uphold the rule of law, since, in the words of Raz, ‘conformity to the rule of law is 
an inherent value of laws, indeed it is their most important inherent value. It is of the essence of 
law to guide behaviour through rules and courts in charge of their application. Therefore, the rule 
of law is the specific excellence of the law’26. Uniformity in interpretation is aimed at like cases 
being treated alike across the Member States, which maintains both branches – equality before 
the law and legal certainty – of a traditional conception of the rule of law and thus being capable 
of guiding individuals, as well as Member States and EU institutions. As will be explained in 
section I.C below, EU law has created a space and regime of action for individuals through a 
system of rights. If EU law was not capable of guiding individuals through this space and regime 
of action, it would be ineffective in achieving its objectives (please see I.B and IV below on how 
the objectives of EU law have a decisive effect on its interpretation). Law is after all a means of 
‘facilitating coordination through the organization and reduction of complexity’27. Just as ‘a knife 
is not a knife unless it has some ability to cut’28, EU law must provide a clear space and regime 
of action for individuals if it is to contribute to integration. It must clearly draw attention to the 
increased variety of cross-border options available to individuals.   
The second feature, in order to achieve uniformity, is that the Court is required to interpret a 
provision in a general and abstract manner, rather than judging the facts of the case at hand. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Fennelly, above n 13, 673 
26 J. Raz, The authority of law: Essays on law and morality (1st ed., Clarendon Press, 1979) 225 
27 S. Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution: Integrating Economic and Systemic Approaches’ (2010) Review of Law & 
Economics 659, 660; I am of course aware of the large debate in analytical jurisprudence about the nature of the law 
and that such a short remark cannot even begin to do justice to answering the question ‘what is law?’  
28 Raz, above n 26, 225 
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‘This procedure thus compels the Court to give a ruling on the content and scope of a rule, which, 
due to its general nature, may itself assume the nature of a general rule’29. Such a procedure 
contributes to the building up of a scheme of rules and a legal system. Indeed, the rulings in the 
form of a general rule, which interpret a provision of EU law, may themselves be interpreted and 
organised schematically, evolving and adding further substance to the content of EU law.  
The third feature, owing to the fact that preliminary rulings answer questions of interpretation in 
the context of real proceedings before national courts30, is that even if the Court must interpret a 
provision of EU law in a general and abstract way, it must nevertheless provide an interpretation 
that would permit the referring court to decide the case without any further difficulty concerning 
the EU law point. However, as has been acknowledged by many judges and scholars31, being 
able to balance the requirements of these two aspects can prove to be difficult.  
Such difficulty also exists with regard to the related issue (in that they both concern the 
generality or specificity of the ruling) of respecting the division of labour between the Court 
which is to interpret provisions of EU law and national courts which apply those provisions32. 
However, as explained by Dumon, ‘since interpretation and application are linked, the former 
being required for the latter, the question submitted and the replies given are frequently and 
necessarily ‘bound up’ with the facts of the case’33.  
Moreover, as will now be explained, the facts of cases and the context in which those facts find 
themselves are crucial to filling in the traité cadre in a way that is relevant and therefore useful 
to individuals, including filling any potential gaps in judicial protection. Could the Treaty 
authors really for example be expected to foresee the bizarre discriminatory practices of sporting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 H. Kutscher, ‘Methods of Interpretation as Seen by a Judge at the Court of Justice’ in Reports of a  
Judicial and Academic Conference held in Luxemburg on 27-28 September 1976, 13 
30 Indeed, the Court does not answer hypothetical preliminary reference questions.  
31 For example, Kutscher, above n 29, 14; F. Dumon, ‘The case-law of the Community. A critical examination of the 
methods of interpretation' in Reports of a Judicial and Academic Conference held in Luxemburg on 27-28 
September 1976, 23 et seq. 
32 For example, Case 77/72, Capolongo [1973] ECR 622, where the Court considered that ‘in the exercise of the 
powers conferred by Article [267]…, the Court, having to limit itself to giving an interpretation of the provisions of 
[Union] law in question, cannot consider legal acts and provisions of national law, the risk being that the reply will 
correspond only imperfectly to the circumstances of the case’.  And even more clearly in Case 32/75, Cristini [1975] 
ECR 108, where the Court stated that it ‘has no jurisdiction to apply the Community rule to a specific case’.  
33 Dumon, above n 31, 25 
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associations such as the ICU requiring those involved in ‘stayering’34 to be of the same 
nationality in Walrave35? It is an incidence of each such unexpected turn that the Treaty is made 
more relevant and useful to individuals.  
	  
B. Creatively developing and making more precise provisions of EU law for the project and 
purpose of integration 
	  
Montesquieu and Robespierre asserted that ‘it is the nature of the constitution that judges follow 
the letter of the law… The judges are the mouth piece which utter the words of the law; 
inanimate being which cannot temper its severity’36. In the words of Advocate General Dumon, 
‘all judges, academic lawyers and legal practitioners realize the simplistic and unrealistic nature 
of the assertions’37. This is most certainly the case with regard to EU law.  
 
i. Precision 
	  
The imprecise nature of the Treaties and preliminary ruling procedure imply that a large part of 
the role of the Court is to make the imprecise provisions more precise. And indeed, moreover, as 
Kutscher, a former President of Chamber at the Court, commented, ‘the vagueness of many of 
the concepts of the Treaty is intended to ensure that the institutions of the Community have a 
certain freedom of action’38.  As will be explained below, it is also this undetermined and 
objective-orientated nature of the Treaties which give rise to the objectives-based and contextual 
methods of interpretation of the Court. 
The process of making general and abstract formulae more precise involves bringing them closer 
to the concrete and less high-ordered ways individuals relate to events that these legal formulae 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The practice in competitive cycling where the motorbike rider and the pacemaker form a team to manage a race.   
35 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1406 
36Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (VI-3, GF Flammarion, 1980) 557  
37 Dumon, above n 31, 10 
38 Kutscher, above n 29, 9 
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regulate39. This could be in the context of the family defining a spouse as someone to whom 
somebody is married40. In the realm inter-State trade, the Court made more precise the vague 
formula of ‘measures of equivalent effect’ contained in Article 34 TFEU with reference to how a 
business person would think of the matter. Article 34 TFEU prohibits ‘[q]uantitative restrictions 
on imports and all measures having equivalent effect’. What measures having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions? Adding further precision to the Dassonville formula41, the 
Court stated in Keck and Mithouard42 that ‘the application to products from other Member States 
of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to 
hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States… so long as 
those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long 
as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of 
those from other Member States’43 (emphasis added). Businesspeople – traders – engaged in 
inter-State trade think of their operations as how they sell their product in foreign markets and 
how the law allows them to sell their product in foreign markets. The Court thus made more 
precise the term ‘measures of equivalent effect’ in a manner that brought it closer to the way 
those businesspeople think about their business operation which is being regulated.  
That is to say that the legal rules resultant upon the interpretive process are to a degree dependent 
on and provide for the real world concrete interactions in the exercise of individuals of their 
autonomy. These pieces of information provided by the real world concrete interactions are 
‘coded’44 by the legal system in the act of union between the abstract and the concrete performed 
by the interpreter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 This paragraph is based on the theoretical observations made by game theorists that: ‘At the core of correlated 
equilibrium is the idea that the correlating device gives an instruction of some kind to the actors… there are many 
such devices expressed in conceptual or abstract form, without any obvious physical manifestation. Norms, for 
example, can take the form of linguistic expression or formulae which function as shorthand for physical behavioral 
manifestations or common knowledge… Legal formulae, which frequently express complex, high-order concepts, 
are at one end of the spectrum running from concrete to the abstract’ (S. Deakin, ‘Legal Evolution: Integrating 
Economic and Systemic Approaches’ (2010) Review of Law & Economics 659, 670) 
40 Case 59/85 Reed [1986] ECR 1296 
41 Dassonville, above n 24, paragraph 5 
42 Case C-267 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 
43 Ibid., paragraph 16 
44 Deakin, above n 27, 673 drawing on system theorists such Morowitz makes the observation that ‘[s]ocial systems 
[such as legal systems] are cognitive orders which store and retain information drawn from their environment and 
transmit it back in such a way as to shape the environment’s structure’.   
	   18 
This however is not a once and for all mechanism of precision. As I repeatedly emphasize 
throughout, indeed it being a core theme of this work  – particularly section iv on developing the 
law and section III on contextual interpretation –, EU law evolves and as such the real world 
information coded by the legal system may change in response to the real world. This is 
particular done through the feedback mechanism that is preliminary reference (Article 267 TFEU) 
as described in section IV.C.ii below. Note also the creativity involved in the interpretation of the 
Court incorporating business concepts which will be elaborated on in section I.B.ii below.           
Making precise the rule in more concrete and ‘real world’ terms also has the benefit of making it 
easier to understand and providing the individual actors better guidance for what variety of 
valuable options is being opened up to them by the Court. It thus provides them with greater 
legal certainty. As will be explained in section iii and IV.B below, this goes hand in hand with, in 
that it provides for the successful achievement of, a project with a purpose such as that of 
European integration.  
The current great challenge the Court faces with regard to providing precision through 
interpretation is with regard to Article 47 of the Charter, the right to an effective remedy. The 
Charter is binding after Lisbon and staggeringly, 50% of preliminary references now refer to 
Article 47 of the Charter45, usually concerning whether EU law rights are effectively protected by 
Member States. As the Court explained in Alassini, the ‘requirements of equivalence and 
effectiveness embody the general obligation on the Member States to ensure judicial protection 
of an individual’s rights under EU law’46. However, the right to an effective remedy contained in 
Article 47 is, like many Treaty provisions, vague and under-determined. Article 47(1) states that 
‘[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the 
right to an effective remedy…’. Moreover, this applies to each and every area of national law in 
which there are EU law rights – from consumer law to capital markets law to immigration law. 
What does an effective remedy entail in each area? The Court will have to repeatedly consider 
simultaneously Article 47, the facts of the case and the concerns specific to each area47.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 H-W. Micklitz, ‘The 'invention' of new remedies by creative interpretation’ (L’interprétation en droit conference, 
Florence, 4 September 2014)  
46 Joined Cases C-317/08, C-318/08, C-319-08 and C-320/08 Alassini [2010] ECR I-0000 
47 Please see below on this process analysis on this process from systems theory and Critical Legal Studies, among 
others – as well from the hermeneutic interpretive theory here used.  
	   19 
Indeed the Court makes more precise provisions of EU law in the context of specific cases. As 
such, despite the Court’s best attempts to provide general and abstract interpretations, these 
interpretations will almost inevitably be to a degree a function of the set of facts that gave rise to 
the issue – and indeed must bear relevance to those facts in order for the interpretation to be a 
useful one allowing the referring court to apply the provision of EU law to the case. Esser – 
based on the hermeneutic theory of communication of Gademer – constructed a ‘hermeneutical 
circle’ methodology of interpretation which posits that ‘judge’s eye has to go from the facts to 
the text and the meaning of the norm, over and again, like in a circle… understanding and 
interpreting the content of the norm better because of the very facts and analysing the facts more 
deeply because of the content of the norm – always narrowing the gap between the two, also 
potentially a gap in time’48.  
This raises the possibility of what I shall term ‘stubbornness’ of either the facts or the law. It may 
be the case that the facts are very strong, with the law being drawn closer and molded around the 
facts or vice versa. This was the case in Viking49 which concerned industrial action and raised the 
issue of whether the freedom of establishment conferred rights which may be relied on against a 
trade union or association of trade unions. In holding that the freedom of establishment did in 
fact confer such rights, the Court was swayed by the effectiveness of the industrial action which 
incorporated an international association of trade unions and in effect prevented any relocation of 
the company. This could also be said to be true of Ruiz Zambrano50 which concerned the 
deportation of Colombian parents and necessarily also their Belgian national children from 
Belgium, this being a case that arouses great sympathy for the applicants. Or indeed Mohammed 
Aziz51 that concerned an individual who could not pay his mortgage in economic crisis-hit Spain.  
In contrast, the late great Lord Bingham, former Chief Law Lord in the United Kingdom, 
emphasized regularly the importance of the supreme interpretive court in a legal system dining á 
la carte. As Baroness Hale, Vice-President of the UK Supreme Court, explained in a recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 S. Grundmann in S. Grundmann, H.-W. Micklitz and M. Renner, Grand Theories of Private Law (Mohr Siebeck 
forthcoming) 000 
49 Case C-438/05 Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10806 
50 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1232 
51 Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz [2013] ECR I-0000 
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lecture52, what Lord Bingham meant by this was that House of Lords then, or UK Supreme Court 
now, will not take a case solely because there is an issue of interpretation to be resolved, but also 
requiring a case where the facts do not strongly point to one result or another and thus skew the 
interpretive analysis. It must be borne in mind that the Court does not have this luxury as Article 
19 TFEU binds the Court to throw an interpretive glance of its collective eye where the 
interpretation of a provision of EU law is unclear. However, what remains and is important for 
present purposes is those charged with interpretation recognize the potential for the law to bent 
around the facts where those facts are strong.    
Esser also raises the possibility of other hermeneutic circles layered upon the primary circle. In 
these terms, the eye of the Court must not only oscillate between the facts and the law, but also 
between the route between the two and the ‘overarching, socially accepted value system’53 – 
which for the Court is primarily the system and objectives of the Treaties, as well as other 
various contexts such as the societal conceptions and economic thinking of the day (see below). 
Esser concludes, and this appears to ring particularly true for the Court, that the role of the judge 
is to ‘carefully coordinating these “elements”, carefully reshaping the basis of the already 
existing decisions’54.  
As Grundmann points out55, this reflection must not only be open to the value system internal to 
law, but also insights from other disciplines. The use of economic concepts is of particular 
importance in the interpretation of the Treaties. The economic thought relied upon might come 
from what is posited in the Treaties such as the competition provisions. But it may also come 
from external to the Treaties to complete them, to make them more precise. These contextual 
interpretive techniques will be discussed in section III below. Also, as will be repeatedly 
highlighted from this point onwards, there is an openness to other social systems, such as 
national political orders.  
Further, on this logic, a further self-building meta-circle can be said to exist: protection of 
individuals and integration by the Court changes both the factual context (more individuals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Baroness Hale of Richmond (Lecture to the Cambridge Union Society, Cambridge, 19 October 2013) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7HJCw8Y8i0, accessed 20 August 2014 
53 S. Grundmann, above n 48, 000 
54 Grundmann, above n 48, 000  
55 Grundmann, above n 48, 000 
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exercising their rights and integrating) and the legal context to the effect that further protection 
of the rights of individuals and further integration is a more fitting and justifiable interpretation 
the next time around56. One could describe this as being the legal manifestation, and legal-
constitutive manifestation as the protection of the rights have an effect of allowing private 
persons a further space and range of action, of an ‘ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe’ envisaged in the preamble of the TFEU, depth breeding depth. Prophesizing this, and in 
fact the whole process of creatively developing and making more precise provisions of EU law 
to achieve integration, the Schuman Declaration announced that ‘Europe will not be made all at 
once, or according to a single plan.’57 
	  
ii. Creation  
	  
Making provisions of EU law more precise requires creativity from the Court. This goes to the 
very heart of the nature of interpretation. Traditional definitions of (legal) interpretation, such as 
interpretation consisting of giving a clear meaning to something which is obscure58, do not 
describe fully what the act of interpretation involves. There is often an innovative aspect to 
interpretation, whether that is interpretation of law or of art or literature. In this regard, Raz 
distinguishes two types of innovation that could be present in the act of interpretation. One could 
reveal ‘a meaning which was so far hidden’59 such as is demonstrated by the psychoanalytic 
interpretation of Hamlet. One could describe the uniformity, effectiveness and primacy of EU 
law requiring the Court to defensively write fundamental rights into EU law in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft60 as general principles as a meaning that was obscure before national 
constitutional orders made clear the importance they placed on fundamental rights protection and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Fit and justification are the two dimensions of interpretation developed by Dworkin (notably in R. Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing, 1986) 228) 
57 Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950 
58 Robert, Dictionnaire de la Langue Française – vide ‘Interprétation’; such conceptions of interpretation are often 
relied on implicitly or explicitly by those describing interpretation in EU law, such as Dumon, above n 31, 9 using 
definition here-cited and A. Albors Llorens, ‘The European Court of Justice, More than a Teleological Court’ (1999) 
2 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 375, 375 who asserts that ‘[t]o interpret means to bring out the 
meaning of law’.  
59 Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason (1st edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2009) 224 
60 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1126 
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their willingness to not apply EU law where it conflicted with fundamental rights. The 
fundamental rights meaning of the primacy of EU law was thus revealed.  
Alternatively, ‘[s]ometimes new interpretations are not prompted by new discoveries of general 
truths, but by a novel realization of how some truths bear on the events of as a story or the 
features of some other works’61. A good example of this would be the free movement of services 
case Carpenter62. Mr Carpenter, an English national, had a business selling advertising space, 
which meant he had to travel to Germany regularly to see clients. He was also the father of minor 
children, and Mrs Carpenter, his Filipino wife, took care of them while he was away for business. 
The British government wished to deport Mrs Carpenter to the Philippines. The Court held that 
‘it is clear that the separation of Mr and Mrs Carpenter would be detrimental to their family life 
and, therefore, to the conditions under which Mr Carpenter exercises a fundamental freedom’63. 
The fundamental freedom in this context is thus the pre-existing work and core focus of attention 
of the Court: the interpretive problem that it faced is whether on facts such as those at issue in 
the case, a breach of a service provider’s fundamental freedom has occurred.  New light is shed 
on the fundamental freedoms by a realization of how some other (legal) truth – the existence of 
fundamental rights protection in the EU legal order, specifically in this case the right to family 
life – bears on them. The novel realization may be stated as the fundamental freedoms requiring 
the protection of the conditions for the exercise of the rights contained therein which includes the 
right to family life.  
Indeed, two key families of interpretation that the Court employs – contextual and teleological 
interpretation – may be regarded as instances of innovation through interpretation. Both are 
analysed in this regard among others in sections III and IV below. However, suffice it to say for 
present purposes that in the context of systematic interpretation the Court uses the truth of 
surrounding provisions and the ratio of the scheme for a novel realization of the meaning of a 
specific provision of EU law. Moreover, as is demonstrated in Carpenter, there is the possibility 
for great creativity in the arrangement of the norms generated by previous interpretation as is 
described in section III.A.i below. At a more meta-level, the interpretive techniques like the 
norms that are subjected to them are abstract representations of complex ideas – this again gives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Raz, above n 59, 225 
62 Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6305 
63 Ibid., paragraph 39 
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the Court much scope as to how to relate them together. This will be evident in what follows64. 
Likewise, types of objectives-based reasoning sees the Court interpret ambiguous provisions of 
EU law in light of the objectives it pursues. It is this process of novel realization which turns the 
general objectives and concepts set out in the Treaties into substantive rules of law.  
 
iii. The project and purpose of integration 
	  
This process of creative interpretation that the Court undertakes is ultimately aimed at, and in the 
context of, achieving the project and purpose of integration. At a conceptual level, in the words 
of Pescatore, ‘the rule of law being by its nature a provision with a certain objective, the 
teleological method is, in the last analysis, the decisive criteria of every legal interpretation’65. 
‘This is doubly true in the context of the treaties which proceed by laying down objectives rather 
than substantive rules’66. Viewed through this lens, the Preamble of the TFEU is instructive as it 
provides the core aim of ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ through what is 
revealed in the rest of that Treaty to be initially only economic integration. Other forms of 
integration were later added through Treaty revisions, prominently Citizenship of the Union 
added by the 1992 Maastricht revision. In this regard, the literal, contextual and teleological 
interpretation that the Court undertakes can all be viewed as attempting to realise the objectives 
of the Treaties.  
However, it must be said that it is at least possible now to conceptualise the EU project as one 
that no longer so much is defined by the realisation of objectives, rather now being now a 
community of principles67, as has been argued by Von Bogdandy. Itzcovich has likewise noticed 
a shift in the discourse of the Court towards fundamental rights as a mode of regulating the 
relationship between the EU and Member States68. That said, principles and fundamental rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 There is depth analysis in this regard in section II.C below. 
65 Pescatore, above n 18, 88 
66 Ibid.  
67 A. von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing, Verlag 
C.H. Beck, Oxford, München 2010) 
68 G. Itzcovich, ‘Fundamental Rights, Legal Disorder and Legitimacy: The Federfarma Case’ Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 12/08, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/08/081201.pdf accessed 27 September 2014 
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being norms, they also conceptually have to a more or less extent have objectives. Moreover, 
they exist with the grand purpose and project of European integration. The system of objectives 
that is created by the system of rights and principles is explained fully in section IV below.   
Moreover, as stated above in section I.A, Article 19(1) TEU places the duty and constraint on the 
Court of ensuing observance of the law, and therefore the rule of law, when interpreting the 
Treaties. From this duty has sprung the Court’s own conception of a ‘Community of law’ which 
it proclaimed in Partie Ecologiste “Les Verts”69.  In Partie Ecologiste “Les Verts”, the Court 
demonstrates a concern for effective judicial protection per se, rather than effective judicial 
protection for the sake of economic integration70. The Court held it had jurisdiction to hear a 
challenge to the decision of the European Parliament brought by the French Green Party even 
though at that time the Parliament was not named by the Treaties as an institution whose acts the 
legality of which could be challenged. Advocate General Mancini stated that ‘whenever required 
in the interest of judicial protection, the Court is prepared to correct or complete the rules which 
limit its powers in the name of the principle [observance of the law] which defines its mission’. 
Following the Advocate General, the Court based its jurisdiction to hear the challenge on the fact 
that the Community was now viewed as one ‘based on the rule of law’71.  
At this juncture it is convenient to note that observance of the rule of law and making sure that 
there are no gaps in judicial protection often goes hand in hand with the project and purpose of 
integration and therefore also important sub-objectives such as creation of an internal market. 
The former provides for the effective realisation of the latter as it enables individuals to enforce 
the system of rights that has established integration and the internal market. Private persons may 
as a result be certain of protection in the exercise of the new cross-border options available to 
them. Any gaps, explained the Court, would ‘lead to a result contrary both to the spirit of the 
Treaty… and to its system’72. Again, it would have been difficult to anticipate in the Treaties the 
situation, for example, where sporting associations exercised monopoly power but fell outside 
the scope of the competition provisions due to not being undertakings.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Case C-294/83 Partie Ecologiste “Les Verts” [1986] ECR 1339, paragraph 23 
70 Even if it is possible to argue that the democratic institutional system that the Court was seeking to protect only 
exists for the purpose of integration, in line with Pecatore’s thesis that final common denominator are the objectives 
of the Union.  
71 Partie Ecologiste “Les Verts”, above n 69, paragraph 23 
72 Partie Ecologiste “Les Verts”, above n 69, paragraph 25 
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The right to effective judicial protection is now enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), as well as it constituting a part of the 
legal foundation of the EU as has been here described. As will be further explored in sections III 
and IV below, the right to effective judicial protection has provided a schematic and teleological 
basis for the creative interpretation of EU law.  
The existence of such ultimate objectives contributes to EU lawyers, and most importantly the 
Court, starting to an extent from a set of shared premises when interpreting EU law. Such an 
analysis makes use of Critical Legal Studies’ starting point – such as is exemplified by Duncan 
Kennedy’s strategy to search for what he calls ‘legal consciousness’ – ‘that it is possible to 
isolate and describe the significant dimensions or aspects of the body of ideas through which 
lawyers experience legal issues’73. The teleological reasoning of the Court is a particularly clear 
and important example of this. Advocate General Dumon stated that ‘it is the duty of the Court to 
scrutinize, weigh up and ponder divorced from any preference or preferences, in order to arrive 
at the cogent judgement as it sees it’74. However, as well as this statement being doubtful for any 
legal interpretive process, the objectives of the EU play a crucial role in shaping how the Court 
interprets EU law, as will be demonstrated in section IV. In the words of Advocate General 
Fennelly, ‘the judicial role is distinct from that of a neutral arbiter played by the normal court in 
Member State whose task is to hold the scales of justice evenly between parties or between 
citizen and the state’75. As, according to A19(1) TEU, the Court’s role is the application and 
interpretation of the Treaties, and as the Treaties contain objectives – ‘an ambitious agenda for 
change’76 – the Court is programmed to experience EU law issues in an integration-biased way, 
among other (sub-)objectives, notably the upholding of the rule of law. While like other courts 
the Court cannot meaningfully said to be a neutral arbiter – its decisions being shaped by its 
economic and political commitments – it can be differentiated from many other courts in that its 
basic premise of (economic) integration, and the broad structure of how to achieve this, is 
evident. This means that unlike many other courts, it makes no claim to neutrality. This is done 
both by the Court in its rulings by way of justification for those rulings and by judges of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 D. Kennedy, The Rise & Fall of Classical Legal Thought (Washington DC, BeardBooks, 2006) 3 
74 Dumon, above n 31, 57 
75 Fennelly, above no 13, 672 
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Court and Advocates General writing extra-judicially. This extra-judicial writing in particular 
shows a particular consciousness of those within the EU legal order of EU legal consciousness. 
No more is this so than with Pescatore, former judge of the Court and most beautiful describer of 
EU law as the law of integration, who analysed ‘[a]insi, que surgisse un problème juridique, le 
niveau de technicité est rapidement dépasse et la Cour se trouve seule avec les quelques 
indication très sommaires qui résultant des traites et, pour le surplus, sa conscience juridique. 
C’est dans ces conditions qu’entre en jeu la considération des objectifs de la Communauté’77 . 
Moreover, this lack of neutrality is legitimate78 to the extent that it is derived from what has been 
posited in the Treaties which were agreed upon by the Member States.  
It had been said in the early days of the Treaties that the Court’s aim in such an objectives-based 
approach combined with the wording of the Treaties was to discover the thinking of the authors 
of those texts of EU law that it was called upon to interpret. However, the absence of travaux 
préparatoires and evolutive nature of interpretation in EU law pours cold water in this idea, of 
course to the extent that the Treaty authors foresaw and intended evolution in EU law79. Pertinent 
remarks have been made in the US Constitution context. Tribe stated with regard to the US 
Constitution, equally applicable today to the Treaty of Rome, that such an attempt to reconstruct 
what the authors of the text had in mind provides little more than ‘a faded snapshot of a bygone 
age’80.  
However, it must be noted, as was done by Lenaerts and and Gutierrez-Fons81, that the use of 
travaux préparatoires is becoming increasingly important. In Pringle82 the Court in interpreting 
the ‘no bail-out clause’ contained in Article 125 TFEU relied on the Treaty of Maastricht’s 
travaux préparatoires. The travaux préparatoires from the European Convention, which drafted 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (‘TCE’), the predecessor to the Lisbon Treaty, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 P. Pescatore 1972, The Law of Integration. Emergence of new phenomenon in international relations, based on 
the experience of the European Communities (Leiden, Sijthoof, 1974) 26 
78 This is a word with many different senses; here the legitimizing factor is the consent of the Member States  
79 Which may certainly have been the case given the visions enunciated in the Schumann Declaration of 9 May 1950: 
‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan.’ 
80 L. Tribe in  A. Scalia (ed), A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton University Press) 
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were also key in the General Court’s interpretation in Inuit Tapiriit83 of the Lisbon Treaty 
amendment to Article 263(4) TFEU that was also present in the TCE. In that case, Advocate 
General Kokott stated ‘[d]rafting history in particular has not played a role thus far in the 
interpretation of primary law, because the ‘travaux préparatoires’ for the founding Treaties were 
largely not available. However, the practice of using conventions to prepare Treaty amendments, 
like the practice of publishing the mandates of intergovernmental conferences, has led to a 
fundamental change in this area. The greater transparency in the preparations for Treaty 
amendments opens up new possibilities for interpreting the Treaties which should be utilised as 
supplementary means of interpretation if, as in the present case, the meaning of a provision is 
still unclear having regard to its wording, the regulatory context and the objectives pursued.’84 As 
concluded by Lenaerts and Gutierrez-Fons, ‘[i]t follows that the more access to travaux 
préparatoires  is granted, the more the [Court] will take them into account’85.  
	  
iv. Developing EU law  
	  
The Court develops EU law in an ever-continuing process. Two ways in which the Court 
develops EU law may be distinguished. Both are almost certainly present at the same time and 
describe different aspects of the same interpretation. The first way the Court develops EU law is 
by making it more precise as has been described above. This adding of precision interacts with 
present-day conditions as what the words, context and objectives of EU law means will vary with 
time.   
The second way the Court develops EU law is by evolving it in line with present-day social 
conditions, social, economic and philosophical concepts, technical developments etc.86 This is 
not to say that does not interpret positive EU law literally, contextually and teleologically, rather 
that the result of these interpretive techniques, and the meaning of provisions, will be different as 
times change. Through this process of interpretation, the EU legal system, in the terms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 T-18/10 Inuit Tapariit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, order of 6 Septmeber 2011, not yet 
reported 
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systems theory, stores and retains information drawn from its environment and transmits it back87. 
The importance this has for shaping the environment’s structure – for example shaping the 
environment towards it being an environment tht is autonomy and interaction enabling – will be 
fully explored in section IV.B below.  
The Court’s evolution of what it considers to be discrimination is of particular importance given 
that the principle of non-discrimination is core to the Treaty system and thus liable to have a 
pervasive effect on the interpretation of EU law. In terms of the objectives of the Treaties, this is 
most notably the case with regard to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, a key, if not the key manner in which the Treaties seek to achieve its aims88.   
Given the long-established nature of the principle of non-discrimination – at least as far back as 
Aristotle’s formal equality principle of ‘treat like cases alike’89 – as well as how central the 
principle is to the aims of the EU law and achieving those aims, what constitutes discrimination 
is a particularly important example of how interpreting courts, in Esser’s terms, must oscillate 
their eye – as well as between the facts and the law – between ‘values which seem “eternal”’ – 
that like cases should be treated alike – and ‘values of a particular time’90 – which gives the 
substance to this formal principle of what constitute like cases. In the words of Advocate General 
Sharpston in Bartsch, ‘the answers to the questions ‘who is covered by the principle of equal 
treatment?’ and ‘what aspects of economic, social, political, civic and personal life are 
encompassed by that principle?’ are not immutable. They evolve with society. As they do so, the 
law reflects that change by starting to state explicitly that certain forms of discriminatory 
treatment, previously unnoticed or (if noticed) tolerated, will be tolerated no longer. Such legal 
changes are an extension – a new and further expression – of the general principle of equality’91.  
Two well-known examples from other jurisdictions show the particular susceptibility of what 
constitutes discrimination to the period and the need to evolve the law according to changes in 
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what are acceptable distinctions for the law to make. In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka92, 
the US Supreme Court held that separate education facilities for black and white children 
deprived the children of the black minority group of equal educational opportunities. In doing so, 
it placed particular emphasis on the ever-increasing importance of a child receiving a good 
education, particularly with regard to getting on in life, and the increasing provision of that 
education by states. This societal change made it even more unacceptable that black and white 
children were educated separately. Marckx v.Belgium93 concerned the need in Belgium family 
law at the time for a mother to go through a court procedure at her own expense to adopt her own 
illegitimate child. The European Court of Human Rights noted that although it was previously 
regarded as permissible and normal in many European countries to draw a distinction between 
the illegitimate and the legitimate family94, recalling the need to interpret the Convention ‘in light 
of the present day conditions’95, it could not ‘but be struck by the fact that the domestic law of 
the great majority of the member States of the Council of Europe ha[d] evolved and [was] 
continuing to evolve, in company with the relevant international instruments, towards full 
juridical recognition of the maxim "mater semper certa est"’96. This may be distinguished from 
Brown v. Board of Education as the court responded to a changing legal context that was 
resultant upon changing societal conceptions of the family and attitudes towards single-parent 
families, rather than directly relying upon societal changes. This second type of legal evolution 
can therefore be also seen as an instance of comparative law. 
A particularly current issue that the Court will no doubt will have to grapple with, and has indeed 
indicated that it will rule on taking account of societal changes, particularly through their 
reflection in the laws of Member States, is the issue of whether the term ‘spouse’ in EU law, 
particularly for the purposes of Directive 2004/38, should be interpreted as included those in 
same-sex unions. As was stated by Advocate General Jarabo Colomer in Maruko97, Europe is 
currently undergoing a ‘long process of accepting homosexuality, which is a vital step towards 
achieving equality and respect for all human beings’98.  In Reed99, which concerned whether 
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unmarried partners should be treated as spouses for the purposes Regulation 1612/68, the Court 
took as the starting point for the crux of its reasoning that ‘since Regulation No 1612/68 applied 
in all of the Member States… any interpretation of a legal term must take into account the 
situation in the whole Community, not merely in one Member State’100. Given that there was no 
real consensus in favour of this at the time of the judgement, the Court felt itself bound to hold 
that ‘[i]n the absence of a general social development which would justify a broad construction, 
and in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the regulation, it must be held that the term 
“spouse” in Article 10 of the Regulation refers to a martial relationship only’101. Drawing upon 
this, the Court in D and Sweden held that the term ‘married official’ did not apply to those in 
same-sex partnerships, even if such partnerships were celebrated and recognised by some 
Member States, as it was ‘not in question that, according to the definitions accepted by the 
Member States, the term “marriage” means a union between two persons of the opposite sex’102.  
However, just as time saw a change in the laws of the Council of Europe states with regard to 
illegitimate children, ‘the legal and social context has evolved at both national and EU level’103 
with regard to same-sex unions. In 2006 in Maruko104, the Court addressed the potentially 
discriminatory effect of a national German law on old-age pensions that provided for a financial 
benefit for the surviving spouse of a worker but refused such benefit to the registered partner. 
Sitting as a Grand Chamber, the Court ruled that ‘if the referring court decides that surviving 
spouses and surviving life partners are in a comparable situation so far as concerns that 
survivor’s benefit, legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings must, as a 
consequence, be considered to constitute direct discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation’105 as given expression in Directive 2000/78. Although marking the now firm EU 
stance against discrimination based on sexual orientation106, the Court was also reserved the 
extent that it left assessment of the comparability of the situation to the referring court. By 2011 
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in Römer107, after a period that saw great progress in the in attitudes towards LGBT individuals 
in Europe, with more and more Member States providing for same-sex unions, the Court evolved 
its stance in line with social and legal evolution, with particular reference to Germany, the 
country from which the reference originated. On facts similar to Maruko, repeating that such 
legislation could amount to direct discrimination on ground of sexual orientation, it went deeper 
into the assessment of the comparability of the situations of married couples and registered 
partners – developing the law by adding precision to the norm as well as by evolving it to match 
the changed social and normative context – , ruling that the referring court should focus ‘on the 
rights and obligations of the spouses and registered life partners as they result from the 
applicable domestic provisions, which are relevant taking account of the purpose and the 
conditions for granting the benefit at issue in the main proceedings, and must not consist in 
examining whether national law generally and comprehensively treats registered life partnership 
as legally equivalent to marriage’108. Finally, in Hay109 the Court went so far as to assess the 
compatibility of opposite-sex married couple and same-sex couples in a registered partnership. 
Addressing this time provisions of a collective agreement that provided for days of special leave 
and a salary bonus granted to employees on the occasion of their marriage, but not of their 
registration as partners, the Court established in a firm tone that the PACS, the French form of 
registered partnership, ‘constitutes, like marriage, a form of civil union under French law which 
places the couple within a specific legal framework entailing rights and obligations in respect of 
each other and vis-à-vis third parties’110. ‘Thus, as regards benefits in terms of pay or working 
conditions, such as days of special leave and a bonus like those at issue in the main proceedings, 
granted at the time of an employee’s marriage – which is a form of civil union – persons of the 
same sex who cannot enter into marriage and therefore conclude a PACS are in a situation which 
is comparable to that of couples who marry’111.  
In light of these developments changing the social and legal context external to the EU legal 
order, and in light of the change that this has affected elsewhere in the legal order thus changing 
the normative context internal to the EU legal order, the term ‘spouse’, for the purposes of EU 
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law, particularly with regards to Directive 2004/38, could be interpreted by the Court to include 
those in same-sex unions. Such an interpretation is made all the more plausible if the teleological 
consideration of effectiveness – here interaction with social and legal developments – of a person 
in a same-sex union’s free movement right was taken into account. Such a right would be 
facilitated for those in same-sex unions if their partners were to be considered spouses and were 
to be given the legal protection flowing from that status.  
	  
C.	  The	  result:	  a	  system	  of	  rights	  which	  protect	  the	  individual	  and	  allows	  for	  the	  
achievement	  of	  the	  aim	  of	  integration	  	  
	  
As well as providing the interpretive methods for EU law – the spirit, general scheme and 
wording of provisions – the Court in Van Gend en Loos112 gave birth to its result: a system of 
rights that protects the individual and allows for the achievement of the aim of integration. In 
that most seminal of judgments, the Court identified two subjects of EU law: ‘not only Member 
States but also their nationals’113. The latter were now empowered in EU law as it conferred 
rights upon them directly which could be invoked by them before national courts. As will be 
described in depth in section IV.C below, the system of rights aims to protect the conditions for 
individual autonomy and thus achieve integration by the interaction of individuals. The 
following is of importance for our present purposes. 
The purpose of granting those rights was to ensure for individuals a wider (economic) space and 
range of action and thus greater cross-border interaction. As stated by a former President of the 
Court, ‘[e]ither the Community is for individuals (physical or legal persons) an attractive but 
distant abstraction which is only of interest to the governments who apply its rules to them at 
their whim, or it is for them a concrete reality and consequently the originator of rights’114. 
Individuals were being granted rights for the purpose and project of integration, so that they 
could exercise their autonomy, and create an internal market. In this regard, it must be noted that 
the Treaties at that time had not been interpreted as to contain anything more than obligations for 
Member States. The system of rights created is thus instrumental as it insures compliance of 
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Member States with their EU law obligations.  In the words of Robert Lecourt, a Judge of the 
Court in Van Gend en Loos, ‘when an individual appears before the judge [of a national court] to 
defend rights he derived from the Treaties, that individual does not only act in his own interest, 
he immediately becomes an auxiliary agent of the [Union]’115.  The ‘Union’ here should not be 
thought of as mainly the EU institutions (although they have an important part to play), but 
rather the ensemble of individuals who interact and bring about European integration through 
their concrete achievements. Giving individuals access to national courts and allowing EU law to 
be invocable by individuals (this procedural aspect being a piece of ingenuity to bridge the gap 
between Member State obligations and individual rights) gave these individuals a wider space 
and range of action, beyond their Member State of origin, which has had the ultimate purpose of 
integration through the construction of an internal market (see section IV.B.iii below).  
The primary value that EU law thus seeks to protect is individual autonomy. The principle of 
non-discrimination, although it may be said to be valuable in its own right and in promoting 
dignity of individuals, has a particular autonomy-increasing function in the EU context. It 
increases individuals’ space of action and options across the Member States (see section IV.B.ii 
below).  
The language of individual rights has been pervasive in EU law. Although framing the discourse 
in terms of rights is not something peculiar to EU law, it is striking how in EU law the culture of 
rights now provides a structural seam as a legitimating and integrating force.  A recent example 
of this is VALE116 that concerned a cross-border conversion of a company governed by Italian 
law into a company governed by Hungarian law. Despite reiterating that ‘companies are 
creatures of national law and exist only by virtue of the national legislation which determines 
their incorporation and functioning’117, the Court went on to overlook the fact that VALE had 
been dissolved in Italy and had not yet been incorporated in Hungary, meaning that the company 
that the Court refers to did not exist legally in any national law, to hold that the ‘refusal to record 
[VALE] in the Hungarian commercial register as ‘the predecessor in law’ is not compatible with 
principle of equivalence’118  and that ‘a practice on the part of the authorities of the host Member 
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State to refuse, in a general manner, to take account of documents obtained from the authorities 
of the Member State of origin during the registration procedure is liable to make impossible for 
the company requesting to be converted to show that it actually complied with the requirements 
of the Member State of origin, thereby jeopardising the implementation of the cross-border 
conversion to which it had committed itself’119, protecting the Article 49 TFEU establishment 
right. Given at the time of the action that right was the sole legal presence of VALE, the right 
had a constitutive effect giving VALE a legal identity. 
The system of rights created by the EU legal order is a manifestation of an underpinning system 
of objectives posited in the system of norms that constitute EU law. If we take as a starting point 
the firm belief of Pescatore that every legal rule has an objective120, these three systems are 
directly correlating. Reference to one particular system or another is dependent upon the 
analytical standpoint. Conceptualization of the EU legal order as a system of rights places an 
emphasis on the individual. The viewpoint is of his entitlement to take action and partake in 
cross-border interaction (that cross-border action and interaction being an objective of the 
individual’s rights). And just as certain derivative rights serve primary rights, certain sub-
objectives serve higher order objectives121. For example, the right of the family member in EU 
law is derived from the primary right of the EU citizen, worker etc. – and its objective, providing 
the EU individual his family members, serves the objective of the conditions of autonomy, 
providing the EU individual with realistic cross-border options. Casting the system in terms 
rights also provides for its functionality in a judicial setting. Rights are instruments that are the 
bread and butter for legal practitioners. They are a language understood and used by lawyers. 
Objectives are not. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Ibid. paragraph 60 
120 Pescatore, above n 18, 88 
121 Please section IV below for a full theoretical explanation of EU law as a system of objectives 
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I. Literal interpretation 
 
A. The operation of literal interpretation 
	  
Literal interpretation is the ascribing to words in a legal provision their ordinary meaning; that is 
to say, deriving ‘legal arguments from the semantic and syntactic features of the language in 
which the legal provisions are expressed’122  or rather, as may necessarily be the case, ‘the 
meaning which a jurist understands’123. Not only that, we must specify a jurist of a particular 
legal system: as the Court stated in CILFIT, ‘legal concepts do not necessarily have the same 
meaning in [EU] law and in the law of the various Member States’124.  
As is implicit in this last specification, the ordinary meaning to a person knowledgeable of a 
particular legal system may well already be imbued by other methods of interpretation. It may 
for an EU lawyer be difficult not to see anything other than an interpretation of a provision 
taking into account contextual and teleological considerations. In the language of the Critical 
Legal Studies school, jurists in a particular legal system approach this mental operation with a set 
of ‘shared premises’. If, as will be argued in section IV below, the fundamental freedoms and 
Citizenship provisions are consistently thought of as aiming at an ideal of autonomy as a means 
of integration, it would be difficult for EU lawyers not to see these provisions in those terms.  
Likewise, EU lawyers will have in mind private and institutional conceptions of family life when 
interpreting provisions of EU law on the family (see section III.A.iv below in particular on 
societal context). The interpretation of the term ‘spouse’ examined in section I.B.iv above is a 
particular example of this. There exists therefore – for the EU lawyer and all others – a degree of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 G. Itzcovich, ‘The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of Justice’ (2009) 10 German Law 
Journal 537, 549; building upon the classificatory structure of J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and  
L. Moral Soriano, ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’ in G. de Búrca 
and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), The European Court of Justice, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 
(Oxford,  
Oxford University Press, 2001) 43, 58 
123 Itzcovich, above n 122, 550 
124 CILFIT, above n 5, paragraph 19 
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unconscious or semi-conscious contextual and teleological interpretation undertaken in any 
interpretive process before such modes of interpretation are employed consciously.  
In the way here described literal interpretation acts as a gateway to the operation of all other 
interpretive techniques. It establishes the range of possible meanings of a provision that other 
methods of interpretation determine. In the words of Kutcher who was at the time President of 
the Court, ‘… every interpretation of a rule has to start with its wording and the ‘ordinary 
meaning’ of a word'125.  
Given that literal interpretation functions to narrow down the range of possible meanings of a 
provision,  the more precise a provision already is, the greater and more determinative role literal 
interpretation will play. Let us remember the comparison Lord Denning MR made (see section 
I.A above) between common law statutes which aim to precisely cover all situations and EU 
provisions which provide general principles expressing aims. At one end of the scale of 
determinacy therefore lie statutes in common law jurisdictions. As a result, great emphasis is 
placed on literal interpretation, an inevitable consequence of much of the legwork being done by 
it without resort being had to other methods of interpretation. Thus, the so-called ‘golden rule’ of 
statutory interpretation for judges in English courts is if a legal text has clear meaning, then the 
judge has to abide by it126. The only exception to that rule is where adherence to the ordinary 
meaning would lead to absurdity127. Such is the emphasis of the English judge on the ordinary 
words of the text, ‘schematic and telelogical’ – the EU law methods of interpretation required to 
be applied by English judges after the UK’s accession – appeared to the Master of the Rolls to be 
‘strange words’128. At the other end of the scale lie provisions of EU law that posit general 
principles expressing aims. As a result, literal interpretation in EU law is often non-determinative. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that it is a less pivotal method of interpretation in this context, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Kutscher, above n 29, 17 
126 Lord Diplock in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs [1980] 1 WLR, at 157 and Lord Lester, ‘English Judges as Law 
Makers’ 
 (1993) PL 269, 272-275 
127 Interestingly assessing whether an interpretation would be absurd requires the use of other interpretative 
techniques. Absurdity perhaps presumes more than anything an original purpose of a rule. For example, the Court of 
Appeal in Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch 197 held that section 7 of the Statute of Frauds 1677, which was 
designed to prevent fraud by requiring declarations of trusts of land to be proved and signed by some writing (a rule 
of evidence), could not be itself used to commit a fraud where there was clear evidence to the contrary.    
128 James Buchanan and Co. v. Babco Forward and Shipping Ltd., [1977] Q.B. 208, 213 (Q.B. Civ. Div.) 
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providing a range of possible interpretations to be chosen from on contextual and teleological 
grounds. 
This relationship between determinacy of legal provision and the emphasis on literal 
interpretation can be seen in the US context in the writing of Justice Scalia of the US Supreme 
Court. Scalia, a firm believer in the democratic value of the predominance of a literal 
interpretation (thus trying to stick as closely as possible to the intentions of the legislature), 
makes clear that ‘Congress can enact foolish statutes as well as wise ones, and it is not for the 
court to decide which is which and rewrite the former’129. However, even such a firm believer in 
the virtues of sticking as close as possible to the text recognises the more open-textured nature of 
the US Constitution; interpretation of that Constitution is a distinctive problem ‘not because 
special principles of interpretation apply, but because unusual principles are being applied to an 
unusual text’130. Such comments may be applied in comparing English statutes with the European 
Treaties.  
 
B. The challenge specific to the EU of linguistic equality 
	  
Article 55(1) TEU states that the texts of the TEU in each of the 24 official languages of the EU 
are ‘equally authentic’131. Article 342 TFEU provides that ‘the rules governing the languages of 
the institutions of the Union shall… be determined by the Council, acting unanimously by means 
of regulations’. Pursuant to Articles 4 and 5 of Regulation No 1/58, ‘documents of general 
application [are drafted in all] official languages’ and are ‘published in [all] official languages’. 
As a result, all acts of general application are published in all 24 official languages of the Union 
and as such there is the potential for variations between the texts in the different language 
versions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Scalia, above n 80, 23 
130 Ibid. paragraphs 20 and 23 
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If there is a variation between different language versions of a text, and if those language 
versions of a text are equally authentic132, how is the difference to be resolved? At this point a 
purely textual interpretation reaches the limits of its capacity. Other interpretive criteria must be 
used to move beyond this impasse.  
The starting point is that among the texts that have different meanings in different languages, one 
meaning must be decided upon133. This is required by one of the key interpretive principles of the 
Court – uniform interpretation – that was arrived at contextually and teleologically. Contextually, 
the Court saw the objective of the preliminary reference system in Van Gend end Loos134 to be 
securing the uniform application of EU law which is teleologically required for the creation of an 
internal market135. A non-uniform interpretation would be inconsistent136 with the system of 
purposes that is set up in the European project137.   
If the Court can no longer refer itself to textual considerations, and if the two other core methods 
of interpretation of the Court are contextual and teleological, then logically it must determine the 
meaning of a provision with these methods. Indeed, the Court held in Boucheraau that ‘the 
different language versions of an [EU] text must be given uniform interpretation and hence in the 
case of divergence between the versions the provision in question must be interpreted by 
reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part’138. In Stauder139, 
a Commission decision authorized Member States to make butter available at a reduced price to 
consumers who were beneficiaries under a social welfare scheme and whose income does not 
enable them to buy butter at a normal price. The decisions stipulated in two of its versions, one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Confirmed by the Court in Case C-296/95 EMU Tabac and Others [1998] ECR I-1605, paragraph 36: ‘[A]ll 
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according to the size of the population of the Member States using the language in question’ 
133 See for example ibid., where the Court stated that ‘the need for a uniform interpretation of [EU] regulations 
makes it impossible for the text of a provision to be considered in isolation but requires, on the contrary, that it 
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134 Van Gen end Loos, above n 4, 12 
135 A teleological move that is so entrenched in the Court’s psyche that it finds itself being used in Citizenship cases 
that have no direct impact on economic integration. See Metock, above n 9.    
136 See section III below as to the importance of consistency in interpretation. 
137 See section IV below as to the EU project consisting of a system of purposes.  
138 Case 30/77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, paragraph 14. See also Case C-449/93 Rockfon [1995] ECR I-4291, 
paragraph 28; Case C-236/97 Codan [1998] ECR I-8679, paragraph 28, and Case C-34/01 Plato Plastik Robert 
Frank [2004] ECR I-4883, paragraph 64 
139 Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419 
	   39 
being the German version, that the purchaser was required to produce a ‘coupon indicating their 
names’, whilst in the other versions, however, it was only stated that a ‘coupon referring to the 
person concerned’ must be shown, thus making other methods of checking in addition to naming 
the beneficiary. The Court began by noting the need for uniform application of provisions of EU 
law and thus uniform interpretation140. It then held that ‘the most liberal interpretation must 
prevail, provided that is sufficient to achieve the objectives pursued by the decision in 
question’141. As well as this objective based interpretation, the Court also interpreted the 
provision contextually by looking at its travaux préparatoires142.  
This method for providing a uniform interpretation does however find its limit where the a 
provision refers to a concept that inherently varies from Member State to Member State or is 
defined by reference to the differing orders – legal or otherwise – of the different Member States. 
This is the case with the notion of ‘public policy’ which was interpreted in the context of 
Directive 64/221 in Boucherau143. The Court reasoned that ‘the concept of public policy may 
vary from one country to another and from one period to another and it is therefore necessary in 
this matter to allow the competent national authorities an area of discretion within the limits 
imposed by the Treaty and the provisions adopted for its implementation’144. That said, the 
importance objectives of the Directive and the need for uniformity were not far from the Court’s 
thought and it added the caveat that ‘in any event, the existence, in addition to the perturbation of 
the social order which any infringement of the law involves, of a genuine and sufficiently serious 
threat to the requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of 
society’145.   
 
C. The relationship of literal interpretation with other methods of interpretation 
	  
As can already be seen, it is difficult – or impossible – for an interpretation to be purely literal; 
whether that be for example due to preconceptions of the interpreter or the fact literal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Ibid. paragraph 3 
141 Ibid. paragraph 4 
142 Ibid. paragraphs 5-6 
143 Boucherau, above n 138,  
144 Boucherau, above n 138, paragraph 27 
145 Boucherau, above n 138, paragraph 35 
	   40 
interpretation will only take you so far. This is particularly the case with regards to provisions 
that are to a large extent under-determined such as Treaty provisions in EU law. In the words of 
CK Allen, ‘the plain and unambiguous meaning of words by which courts often believe 
themselves to be governed is really a delusion, since no words are so plain and unambiguous that 
they do not need interpretation in relation to a context of language and circumstances’146. The 
context and objectives of a provision – in the broads terms explained in sections III and IV below 
– always have a role to play. 
Literal interpretations can be rejected when they run contrary to objectives and context. For 
example, Article 267 TFEU would seem to read as giving national courts jurisdiction to declare 
acts of Union institutions invalid147. However, in Foto-Frost148 the Court held that ‘the coherence 
of the system [of remedies] requires that where the validity of a [Union] act is challenged before 
a national court the power to declare the act invalid must also be reserved to the Court of 
Justice’149. A systematic interpretation revealed a power to declare an act invalid reserved only to 
the Court. Moreover, allowing national courts to declare acts of Union law invalid would run a 
coach and horses through the uniformity of application of EU law.  
Defrenne II150 concerned the interpretation of Article 157 TFEU which states ‘[e]ach Member 
State shall ensure the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work 
of equal value is applied’. On a literal interpretation therefore, Article 157 TFEU only has 
Member States as its addressees. The core of the Court’s reasoning shows a balancing of the 
value of literal interpretation against teleological demands. In finding that Article 157 TFEU also 
had individuals as its addressees, the Court focused on the importance of not denying individuals 
their EU law rights151, that is to say their claim to the conditions of autonomy. It then noted that 
there was an objective to be achieved within a set period (that period having expired)152 – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 C.K. Allen, Law in the Making (7th edition, Oxford University Press, 1964) 506 
147 Article 267(1) TFEU states that the Court ‘shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the 
interpretation of the Treaties; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies 
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148 Case C-314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR I-4199 
149 Ibid., paragraph 17 
150 Case 43/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR 456 
151 Ibid. paragraph 31 
152 Ibid. paragraph 32 
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equality of pay between men and women – and ‘that he effectiveness of this provision cannot be 
affected by the fact that the duty imposed by the Treaty has not been discharged by certain 
Member States and that the joint institutions have not reacted sufficiently energetically against 
this failure to act’153. In this sequence of reasoning, it finished by holding ‘[t]o accept the 
contrary view would be to risk raising the violation of the right to the status of a principle of 
interpretation, a position the adoption of which would not be consistent with the task assigned to 
the Court by Article [267 TFEU]’154. Not only was the immediate objective being threatened but 
also the entire system of objectives that constitutes EU law and ultimately the project and 
purpose of integration. The immediate threat was also metaphysical.  
Finally, the Court like English courts (as mentioned above) does not interpret a provision in a 
certain way if it leads to absurd result, this being a special application teleological 
interpretation155. As explained by Advocate General Mayras in Fellinger, ‘[i]f such a 
construction were to lead to a nonsensical result in regard to a situation which the Court believed 
the provisions were intended to cover, certain doubts may be properly entertained in regard to 
it’156.  
A notable recent example of the Court interpreting a provision of EU law according to its 
objective rather than sticking strictly to the text is Sturgeon157 that concerned the interpretation of 
Regulation No 261/2004158 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to 
passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delays on flights. 
Regulation 261/2004 sets up two categories of passengers: those whose flights are delayed who 
are entitled to assistance only and those whose flights are cancelled who are entitled to assistance 
and compensation. The Sturgeon family’s flight was ‘delayed’ by 25 hours. In reality, the airline 
had renamed the next day’s flight as the flight the Sturgeons were due to be on the day before. 
Within the strict text of the directive, the Sturgeons were only entitled to compensation. The 
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158 Regulation No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing 
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Court noted ‘a [Union] act must be interpreted in such a way as not to affect its validity’159. 
Given the superior EU law objective and principle of equal treatment, the Court reasoned that 
‘given that the damage sustained by air passengers in cases of cancellation or long delay is 
comparable, passengers whose flights are delayed and passengers whose flights are cancelled 
cannot be treated differently without the principle of equal treatment being infringed’160. 
Otherwise, airlines would be completely able to avoid compensating passengers for cancelled 
flights by referring to them as (very long) delays. That would be state of absurdity and render the 
rule toothless.  
However, literal interpretation can place limits on more teleological considerations, particularly 
when it is combined with systematic considerations. The full effet utile of directives would 
require that they had horizontal direct effect from the time their implementation period was up. 
However, the Court in Marshall161 stuck closely to the text of Article 288 TFEU which states 
inter alia that a ‘directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member 
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
method [emphasis added]’ to hold that it ‘follows that a directive may not of itself impose 
obligations on an individual and that a provision of a directive may not be relied upon as such 
against such a person’162. In addition, the Court has made reference to the system of legislative 
measure open to the Union legislature. In Faccini Dori, the Court held that to allow an individual 
to rely on the provisions of a directive against another individual ‘would be to recognize a power 
in the [EU] to enact obligations for individuals with immediate effect, whereas it has competence 
to do so only where it is empowered to adopt regulations’163.  
This latter point is perhaps therefore the crucial difference with Defrenne II. While in Defrenne 
II there were strong teleological and contextual considerations militating in favour of departing 
from a literal interpretation while with regard to horizontal direct effect of directives, there were 
contextual reasons militating against.  
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D. The values protected by literal interpretation  
	  
As has been touched on in section I.B.iii above and will so again in section IV.A  below, the rule 
of law has a particular role to play in the bodies of law of grand projects with purposes. 
Predictable law – through sticking to the ‘ordinary meaning’ of words as above elaborated –, 
which provides for legal certainty, marks out for the individual his cross-border range of options. 
The rule of law is of course a value and an objective in itself – it is after all, as explained by Raz, 
the value intrinsic to law. However, EU law would not be in existence without the project and 
purpose of integration. Therefore, the rule of law is an objective subjugated to this higher 
objective in the EU context.  
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II. Contextual interpretation  
	  
A. Some types of context 
	  
Context is a broad term, or at least – by definition – broader than the object of contextualisation. 
For our present purposes interpreting provisions of EU law by reference to their context, five 
types of contexts may be distinguished: (i) the normative context internal to a particular legal 
system which may be subdivided into (a) the substantive context (b) the procedural context and 
(c) the institutional context, guiding substantive norms, and the procedural and institutional 
context amounting to an architectural context; (ii) the pre-normative context that is the legislative 
process that led to the adoption of a norm; (iii) the normative context external to a legal system, 
i.e. norms from other legal systems; (iv) the societal context, particularly at the time of 
interpretation; and (v) knowledge and understanding from disciplines other than law, particularly 
where legal concepts originate from other disciplines. It must, however, be acknowledged from 
the outset that when the Court refers to context, it only mean the normative context internal to 
EU law. That said, it does openly refer to the pre-normative context – the travaux préparatoires 
– and norms from other legal systems. Moreover, it does refer itself, consciously or 
unconsciously, to the societal context and knowledge and understanding from other disciplines 
even, even if it does not always acknowledge that this is so.   
	  
i. Normative context internal to a particular legal system  
	  
The Court refers itself to the EU law normative context. In Van Gend en Loos the Court placed 
upon itself a requirement to consult ‘the general scheme’164. This schematic interpretation 
requirement was later described in CILFIT in the following manner: ‘every provision of 
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Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of 
Community law as a whole’165. As analysed by Itzcovich, this may occur at three different levels 
of zoom: ‘the same normative text, or belonging to the same area of the legal system, or 
belonging to different areas of the same legal system’166.  
The most common normative context internal to the EU legal order on which the Court bases its 
interpretation is the substantive context of a provision. This is not to say that it cannot be of great 
importance and involve dealing with issues fundamental for the EU legal order and the project 
and purpose of integration. For example, there has been a degree of convergence in interpretation 
between the fundamental freedoms167. As has been analysed with regard to creation of a system 
of rights in section I.C above and will be analysed with regard to teleological interpretation in 
section IV below, norms in the EU legal system represent the positing of objectives. These 
shared objectives represent the deeper conceptual similarities that link provisions of law together 
and call for their coherent interpretation.    
However, it has often been the examination of the procedural and institutional context, in 
conjunction with the substantive context of the Treaty scheme as a whole, which has led to the 
most foundational, creative and spectacular results. No more is this so than the Court drawing in 
Van Gend end Loos168 on the existence of Article 267 TFEU in the Treaty – a procedure which 
presupposes the invocation of provisions of EU law before national courts - to adduce that in 
principle provisions of EU law are invocable before national courts, that is to say the doctrine of 
direct effect. The systemic context, in the words of Pescatore, therefore ‘is a complete 
architecture, [presumed to be] coherent and well thought out… : a general scheme of legislation, 
structure of the institutions, arrangement of powers (in conjunction, where appropriate with the 
objectives), general concepts and guiding ideas of the Treaties’169. The architecture posited in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 CILFIT e. a., above n 5, paragraph 20 
166 Itzcovich, above n 122, 549 
167 Such as with regard to a broad conception of restriction in Dassonville (above, n 24) and Cassis de Dijon (above, 
n xx) in the context of the free movement of goods being reflected by broader conceptions in the context of the free 
movement of services (Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4421), the freedom of establishment (Case C-55/94 
Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165) and the free movement of workers (Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921)  
168 Van Gend en Loos, above n 4, 12 
169 Pescatore, above n 18, 87 
	   47 
Treaty scheme in combination with the substance of that scheme as a whole thus led to the 
creation of constitutional doctrines.  
Norms are also importantly generated by previous interpretations; in the context of EU law these 
being previous judgements of the Court. Given that there is now over fifty years since the 
seminal judgement in Van Gend end Loos of 1963, and even more since the Treaty of Rome 
signed in 1957, the EU legal order now possesses a large number of previous judgements, and 
thus new and still rather abstract norms. On the one hand, these new interpretations also become 
themselves objects of interpretation. They are after all formulated in a general and abstract way 
so as to be applicable to more cases than the specific case at hand (see section I.A above).  On 
the other hand, the norms from these interpretations generated fit into, and from that point form 
part of, a logic puzzle – or mosaic170 or collage171 – into which norms generated by future 
interpretations must also fit. Indeed, these previous judgements are referred to by the Court and 
cited as authority for its new interpretations. This is the case even though the Court is not strictly 
bound by its previous judgements, this not being out of the ordinary for an interpretive body 
which is at the apex of a legal system. If the Court was strictly bound by its previous judgement, 
it would be left with a narrower scope for it to develop the law and evolve its interpretation. This 
would neither be appropriate for a court whose work finds creation and evolution so close to its 
core nor for one whose ultimate imperative is the system of objectives established by the Treaties 
(as described in section IV below).  
It is of interesting that both Mancini, a former judge of the Court, and Azoulai, a former 
référendaire, both use artistic images to describe the process of interpretation a provision of EU 
law in the context of norms internal to the EU legal order.  
This first discloses a creative attitude towards – and indeed a need for creativity in the use of – 
even this most dry of interpretive techniques. It is after all the mode of interpretation closest to 
pure logic. In this regard, the Court does often even in fact use quasi-logic criteria such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170Mancini cited by T. Koopmans, ‘The Theory of Interpretation and the Court of Justice’, in D. O’Keeffe and A. 
Bavasso (eds), Judicial review in European Union Law – Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley (The 
Hague-London-Boston, Kluwer Law International, 2000) 45, 49 
171L. Azoulai, ‘The Court of Justice and the social market economy: The emergence of an ideal and the conditions 
for its realization’ (2008) 45 CMLR 1335, 1339; Perhaps the best analogy that can be made is with arrangement of 
Lego bricks; while Lego bricks offer a great variety of combinations and thus scope for creativity, they nevertheless 
have limits on the way they may be arranged. I am grateful to Professor Michal Bobek for this analogy.  
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analogy172 and a fortiori reasoning173. Interpretation in the normative context of a legal system 
where there is already a large system of norms thus bears a closer resemblance to completing a 
jigsaw puzzle or assembling flat-pack furniture than to say painting a picture or writing a novel.   
However, on the one hand, while there is only one possible solution to a jigsaw puzzle or flat-
pack furniture, there are many possible arrangements of the abstract formulae contained in the 
provisions and judgments which provide interpretation of those provisions within the EU legal 
order. Given that legal norms often express compressed and complex ideas, it is unsurprising that 
many different analytical linkages can be drawn between them. This arrangement of abstract 
norms – mosaic or collage making – is a process that gives scope for, and indeed requires of the 
Court, a certain creative zeal. In Viking174 and Laval175, which concerned industrial action and 
raised the issue of whether the freedom of establishment and the free movement of services 
conferred rights which may be relied on against a trade union or association of trade unions, 
brought together and attempted to arrange coherently (not always successfully as will be 
analysed in section C below) a diverse range of formulae in dealing with the issue at hand.   
On the other hand, there are certain larger more important pieces of the mosaic that must be 
included in the form of seminal and principle-setting judgments of the Court that are to be 
included (or consciously replaced) and structure the arrangement. There is again similarity to 
pieces of a jigsaw in that these pieces fit together in a certain way already decided upon by the 
Court, albeit open to the Court in principle to depart from this arrangement if compelling reasons 
required it. In this regard, the interpretations that make more precise and add flesh to the 
substantive bones of the traité cadre form themselves an arrêts cadre, or more specifically 
formulae/principes cadre176.  
	  
ii. The pre-normative context  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Famously in Case C-281/98 Angonese [2000] I-4161 
173 On many occasions, for example recently in Case C-297/13 Data I/O [2014] ECR I-0000 
174 See Viking, n 49 above, for a full description of the fact 
175 Case C-341/05 Laval  [2007] I-11845  
176 See Azoulai, above n 171, 1339 for a list of formulae and framework decisions of the Court  
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The Court refers itself to the pre-normative context that is the legislative process that led to the 
adoption of a norm. As described in section I.B above, the use of travaux préparatoires is 
becoming increasingly important. Travaux préparatoires have been used by the Court in two 
recent high-profile cases: in Pringle177 in interpreting the ‘no bail-out clause’ contained in Article 
125 TFEU and in Inuit Tapiriit178 interpreting the Lisbon Treaty amendment to Article 263(4) 
TFEU.  
 
iii. The normative context external to the legal system  
	  
The Court refers itself to the normative context external to the EU legal scheme, in particular to 
the laws of its Member States. This is often referred to as the Court taking a comparative law 
approach. In Brasserie du Pecheur and Factortame179, the Court stated that it was for it ‘in 
pursuance of the task conferred on it by Article [19 TEU] of ensuring that in the interpretation 
and application of the Treaty the law is observed, to rule on such a question in accordance with 
general accepted methods of interpretation, in particular by reference to the fundamental 
principles of the [EU] legal system, and, where necessary, general principles common to the 
legal systems of the Member States’180. Moreover, Article 6(3) TEU states that the EU must 
respect ‘[f]undamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, [which] shall constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law’.  
As was demonstrated regard to the issue of whether the EU term ‘spouse’ is to be interpreted as 
including same-sex partners in section I.B above, reliance on Member State norms can act as a 
conduit for taking into account the societal context of the Member States reflected in those 
norms. Two particular types of societal context for which norms act as a conduit may be 
distinguished. On the one hand, it may be that the context of the norms of all the Member States 
which are taken into account on a particular issue. As was the case when the Court was searching 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Case C-370/12 Pringle, judgement of 27 November 2012, not yet reported  
178 T-18/10 Inuit Tapariit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, order of 6 Septmeber 2011, not yet 
reported 
179 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029 
180 Ibid. paragraph 27 
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for a definition of marriage in D and Sweden, recognising (at that time) it was ‘not in question 
that, according to the definitions accepted by the Member States, the term “marriage” means a 
union between two persons of the opposite sex’181. On the other hand, a particular social context 
of a Member State, reflected in its norms may be taken into account. This has particularly been 
so in cases involving fundamental rights and identities which are a function of basic values and 
structures of societies. In this regard, Article 4(2) TEU gives textual authority for the EU to 
respect the ‘national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional’ of Member States. As the Court held in Omega Spielhallen182 and Sayn-
Wittgenstein183, ‘it is not indispensable for the restrictive measures issued by the authorities of a 
Member State to correspond to a conception shared by all Member States as regards the precise 
way in which the fundamental right or legitimate interest in question is to be protected and that, 
on the contrary, the need for, and proportionality of, the provisions adopted are not excluded 
merely because one Member State has chosen a system of protection different from that adopted 
by another State’184 . In Omega it was Germany’s particularly strong protection of the right to 
dignity and in Sayn-Wittgenstein it was Austria’s abolition of the use of ‘von’ in line with their 
abolition of aristocracy. Such a societal context sensitive approach allows for varying 
fundamental rights protection between the Member States. However, as Lenaerts and Gutierrez-
Fons have pointed out, this finds it limit where ‘national measures that derogate from 
fundamental freedoms… adversely affect the essential interests of the EU’185. Such a bottom line 
is evident also with regard to the level of protection the Charter offers. In Melloni, the Court held 
that ‘Member States are free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, 
provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the [Court], 
and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby comprised’186.  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Joined Cases C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P D and Sweden [2001] ECR I-4319, paragraph 34 
182 Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609 (pre-introduction of Aritlce 4(2) TEU) 
183 Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010] ECER I-13693 (post-introduction of Article 4(2) TEU; thus ostensibly 
indicating the introduction of Article 4(2) TEU has not made a substantive difference in practice) 
184Omega, above n 182, paragraphs 37 and 38 and Sayn-Wittgenstein, above n 183, paragraph 91 
185K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU law’ 
(2010) 47 CMLR 1629, 1632 
186 Case C-399/11 Melloni, judgment of 26 February 2013, not yet reported, paragraphs 60 and 61 
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iv. Societal context  
	  
The Court refers itself to the societal context – or at least to its own societal conceptions – 
directly at the time of judgement, even if this is done implicitly. The Court for example may be 
said to have a traditional image of the nuclear family. This is no more so the case than in 
Carpenter where the Court was keen to emphasise ‘Mrs Carpenter continues to lead a true family 
life there, in particular by looking after her husband's children from a previous marriage’187. As 
such, Mrs Carpenter was conceived of a good wife worthy of a derivative permanent resident 
right. She fulfilled her function of looking after her husband’s children while he, the breadwinner, 
could take full advantage of the cross-border economic options available to him.  
Some of the most important changes in societal context in recent years have been due to the 
financial crisis. Mohamed Aziz188 concerned the repossession of a home after the mortgagor lost 
his job in financial crisis-hit Spain. The substantive issue of transferring title to the bank had 
already been decided when Mr. Aziz attempted to challenge this in the enforcement proceedings. 
This was barred under Spanish law. However, the Court required the creation of interim relief189 
so that it could go back and ensure the substantive fairness of the initial contract. Unfortunately, 
a change in social conditions such as a financial crisis may be autonomy reducing. However, 
there was already regulation present – the unfair consumer terms directive190 – that had as it 
objective the conditions for autonomy in that it protects consumers from the dominance of 
businesses. Swayed by the autonomy-reducing conditions of financial crisis, the Court felt 
pressure to give Mr. Aziz at least a fair crack at autonomy through granting him interim relief so 
that he could challenge the substantive fairness of the mortgage contract.  
 
v. Political context  
	  
A refusal of a Member State, usually of a national court, to apply EU law now appears to be out 
of the question. However, the Court remains sensitive to the concerns of political (and legal) 
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188 Mohamed Aziz, above n 51 
189Ibid. paragraph 52 
190Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29) 
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systems in Member States. On a few high profile occasions such as with regard to what 
constitutes a trade barrier in a series of cases from Dassonville191 to Keck192 and the need for a 
cross-border element and the protection of Citizenship rights in Zambrano193, Dereci194, 
McCarthy195, Iida196 and O & S197 the Court rows back on its previous particularly innovative 
interpretations under pressure from Member State political systems. Such pressure from Member 
State political systems will be described as an environmental factor in the evolution of EU law in 
section IV.B.iii below.  
	  
iv. Knowledge and understanding from other disciplines  
	  
The Court may, although not finding their way into the posited grounds of a judgement, refer 
itself to knowledge and understanding from disciplines other than law, particularly where legal 
concepts originate from other disciplines. These concepts once introduced in one area, such as 
competition law, feed through the rest of the Treaties, such as through to the free movement 
provisions, due to the Court looking at the systemic context of provisions it interprets198.  
It is uncontroversial to point out that the Court – like all courts – use conceptions from moral and 
political philosophy. After all, at the heart of the rule of law and the principle of non-
discrimination is the Aristotelean formal concept of justice and equality – that like cases should 
be treated alike, and that different cases should be treated differently. Likewise, I will go onto 
argue in section IV below is that the guiding principle of the Court in the project and purpose of 
integration is providing the individual with the conditions for autonomy. Moreover, like many 
economic concepts such as economic efficiency (and party autonomy) requiring the control of 
cartels and monopolies as is posited in the competition provisions, grand philosophical concepts 
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192Keck and Mithouard, above n 42 
193Ruiz Zambrano, above n 50 
194Case C-256/11 Dereci and ors [2011] ECR I-0000 
195Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3393  
196Case C-40/11 Iida [2012] ECR I-0000 
197Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O and S [2012] ECR I-0000 
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as human dignity, freedom, democracy and equality are provided for in the EU legal system 
through Article 2 TEU.   
Insight from economics cross-fertilises through systemic interpretation through the Treaty 
system. Walrave199 and Bosman200 concerned rules in sport where the sports associations had 
monopoly power but were not subject to the control of the competition provisions as they were 
not undertakings. These horizontal application of free movement provision cases are in general 
very interesting for examining the interpretation of the Court, as is reflected in referring to them 
throughout the present analysis. They have offered creative combination of interpretive 
techniques. Literal interpretation began the interpretive argument by making play of the fact that 
addressees of Article 45 TFEU were not explicitly Member States 201. This left the door open for 
the cross-fertilisation through the Treaty of the ordo-liberal, and indeed morally autonomy 
supporting, idea of protecting individuals from monopoly power. That this was not far from the 
surface is confirmed by the attention Advocate General Lenz pays to the competition provisions 
in Bosman202.  
These last three contexts external and not directly relating to the EU legal system provide a 
context from which the Court may develop EU law, as has been explored in section I.B above, 
particularly by its evolution in line with these contexts. Combine this with a more tradition 
understanding of context – the surrounding norms internal to the EU legal system – and what 
emerges is multi-point oscillation of the judge’s eye (again, in Esser’s terminology), from fact to 
law to multiple contexts. This hermeneutic conception of interpretation bears similarities to 
insights from sociological conceptions of law. For example Scholten, relying on Geny, describes 
a legal system as an ‘open system’ where the ‘legal system is never finished, as the reality for 
which it has been made is in a process of continuous flux’203. In this vain, Mancini compared the 
EU legal system to an ‘unfinished mosaic [as] every new stone… must fit in the existing 
pattern’204. As has been described by Deakin drawing on the behavioural science perspective of 
Luhmann, such a social system is ‘operationally closed but cognitively open… they have the 
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201 Walrave and Koch, above n 35, paragraphs 16-17 
202 Case C-415/93 Opinion of Advocate General Lenz [1995] ECR I-4921 
203 Scholten as cited by Koopmans, above n 170, 49 
204 Mancini as cited by Koopmans, above n 170, 49 
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capacity to process information from the external environment in such a way as to as to make it 
meaningful in the context of their internal process. The legal system receives information from 
the social context in which its rules are applied – for example, the economy… [and then is] 
“coded” into juridicial form’205.  
	  
B. The context providing objectives, the objectives providing a context 
	  
As will be described in section IV below, the Treaty scheme was used by the Court to derive an 
aim of integration through giving individuals rights, and therefore space for action and cross-
border interaction, specifically to produce originally an internal market. This was the original 
meta-telos206 derived by the Court. Thus, in Van Gend en Loos, the Court announced itself 
settling on such a goal, derived from the ratio of the scheme, when it stated that ‘the objective of 
the EEC Treaty… is to establish a Common Market’207. However, this establishment of the 
objective in turns provides an ultimate context. In the words of Begoetxea, MacCormick and 
Moral Soriano, drawing on the hermeneutic interpretive theory of Dworkin, ‘[t]he part makes 
sense in the context of the whole, and the whole gets its sense out of the dynamic interaction of 
the parts’208. What emerges is a system of objectives as will be described in section IV below.  
The internal market is now no longer the only meta-telos or sub-objective in the grand project 
and purpose of integration. The Union now has now many sub-objectives and values. These sub-
objectives and values posited in different provisions of primary and secondary Union law often 
clash. This makes systematic interpretation in light of a core sub-objective such as the internal 
market more difficult. However, it can be done and moreover it should be done in order to show 
the point de départ of the Court – the way the judges, Advocates General, and referendaires 
experience the legal issues that come before them. A core value of contextual interpretation is its 
capacity to provide coherence and stability, as will be expanded upon in section C below.    
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207 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, 12 
208 J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, above n 122, 44 
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The golden thread that runs through the Treaty – and importantly the way it has been interpreted 
by the Court – in the areas of the fundamental freedoms, competition and Citizenship of the 
Union is the protection of the conditions of autonomy. An argument to why this is so with regard 
to the fundamental freedoms and Citizenship will be provided in section IV.B below209. However, 
it is important to note here with regard to autonomy’s plausibility as a pre-eminent sub-objective 
that it is a value that insists on many other values – being committed to autonomy necessarily 
commits a person to value-pluralism. That opens the door for autonomy as the unifying factor in 
the purpose and project of integration. What cements its place as the unifying factor is the great 
extent with which other values aim at the conditions of autonomy – a description of this is 
provided in section IV.B below.  
Moreover, the objection that such a great focus on the individual that this would provide does not 
pay close enough attention to the part played by Member States and their governments. First, 
they have been accounted for below as an environmental factor in the evolution of EU law. 
Second, EU law has since Van Gend end Loos been structured with the individual at its centre. 
The structure of a typical free movement case gives pride of place to the autonomy of the 
individual through the legal construct of whether his free movement right(s) have been infringed. 
It is the restrictor of that right – typically a Member State – who must justify that restriction with 
often close scrutiny in the form of a proportionality analysis.  
This golden-thread then provides the way to link up the various parts of the legal system and 
various contexts in the project and purpose of integration. Legal norms are complex and abstract 
and can be fitted together in a variety of ways. The meta-teleology can thus be conceptualized as 
not itself a subject of this interpretive process, rather guiding the interpreter through it.    
	  
C. The use and value of contextual interpretation  
	  
Contextual interpretation provides for steadiness, coherence, and stability on the one hand and 
adaptability on the other. Reference to the context internal to the EU legal order usually provides 
for stability and reference to the context eternal to the EU legal order provides for adaptability. 
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Interpreting with regard to the context internal to the EU legal order only usually provides for 
stability as such a context, has been seen, can lead to creative and dramatic results.  
The value of the coherence of the internal working of legal order is that the steadiness and 
stability allows individuals to rely on that legal order. If EU law is to provide individuals with 
the conditions of autonomy (see section IV) below, this implies a steadiness of commitment to 
this vision by the Court. Of course, individuals need to feel that their cross-border goals, projects 
and relationships are secure. In this sense, contextual interpretation provides for legal certainty. 
However also, steadiness is particularly required in the context integration through the 
interaction of individuals as the most integrating interaction occurs in the form of long-term 
project and relationships (as will be argued in section IV below).  
Comparing legal rules to tools is again appropriate. As well as being a means to achieve 
objectives, the capacity to reach those objectives is affected by the quality of the tool. Just as 
textual interpretation of a provision provides for legal certainty and thus that particular rule as a 
tool being effective, systematic legal interpretation keeps many tools working smoothly together. 
It is for this reason that Lenearts and Gutierez-Fons describe systemic interpretation as putting 
together the ‘different parts of the engine’210.  
The importance of this coherence – of this internal systemic consistency – to the Court is 
emphasised by the facts it seeks to justify its interpretation in these terms even when there is no 
such coherence. The Court in Viking Line211 cited Schmidberger212 and Commission v France213 
as support for the proposition that Article 49 TFEU could be relied on by a private undertaking 
against a trade union or an association of trade unions. Schmidberger and Commission v France 
both concerned restrictions caused by individuals acting collectively. However, crucially in those 
cases the free movement of goods was held to be able to be relied upon against a Member State 
who failed to adopt the measures to deal with obstacles214. The Court in Viking Line cited the 
paragraphs to this effect to interpret Article 49 TFEU as being able to be relied upon against 
trade unions or associations of trade unions. In the words of Weatherill, this amounted to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210Lenearts and Gutierez-Fons, above n 81, 13  
211 Viking Line, above n 49, 62 
212 Case C-35/97 Commission v France [1998] ECR 1-5325 
213 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR 1-5659 
214 Commission v France paragraph 30 and Schmidberger paragraph 57 and 62 
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shameless rewriting215 Schmidberger and Commission v France. Such was the desire of the Court 
to make all the stones in the mosaic fit together that they removed two and repainted them.  
This desire to present interpretations as being consistent with previous interpretations stems from 
a vision of law that routes the validity of law in its consistency. In the words of Deakin, ‘[e]ven 
incremental innovations in the law, and certainly more radical ones, depend for their validity in 
the internal legal order on being presented in terms which describe them as a development from 
the existing stock of precedents’216. 
Legal systems are of course however not closed systems. They must adapt to changes in other 
social systems in order to be relevant and socially accepted. The Court provides for this 
adaptation through interpreting EU law taking into account changing contexts external to the 
legal system. A good example of this is the Court adapting to the change in economic forms 
brought about by privatisation. In Foster v British Gas217 the Court took a broad view of what 
counted as emanations of the state in order to hold a directive to have direct effect against the 
newly privatised British Gas. This taking account of the context is key to EU law effectively 
providing the conditions for autonomy in order to achieve cross-border action and interaction. It 
is in this way that if this type of contextual interpretation is done successfully, as acknowledged 
by a judge of the Court, the result is the construction of the material that is legal provisions ‘in 
such a way as to correspond to the needs of social life’218.   
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 S. Weatherill, ‘The Elusive Character of Private Autonomy in EU Law’ in D. Leczykiewicz and S. Weatherill 
(eds), The Involvement of EU law in Private Law Relationships (Hart Publishing, 2013) 15 
216 Deakin, above n 27, 678 
217 Case 188/89 Foster v British Gas [1990]ECR I-3343 
218 Koopmans, above n 170, 49 citing Wolfgang Friedmann of the sociological movement in law, the idea’s origin 
finding itself with Geny. 
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IV. Teleological Interpretation  
	  
Teleological interpretation refers to techniques used to interpret provisions of law with reference 
to its purpose; whether that be the purpose of that particular rule, a particular group of rules, or a 
body of law as a whole. For our present purposes, that would correspond, for example, most 
locally to a particular provision of EU law such as Article 45 TFEU free movement of workers, 
more generally the fundamental freedoms or internal market as a whole, and on the largest scale 
the whole of the EU legal system.  
Just as law becomes more and more specific as we move from the scale of a legal system as a 
whole to a specific provision of law in that legal system, so may the purpose. A particular grand 
objective may be served by aiming at several sub-objectives and sub-sub-objectives and so on, 
the technique for achieving these objectives being more and more specific provisions of law. 
Moreover, there may be a variety, or even a huge variety, of sub-objectives that may be aimed at 
in order to achieve a grand objective. In such a situation, particular sub-objectives may likely 
have to be chosen as the way forward for achieving the grand objective.  
In this light, sub-objectives are conceived as being at the same time means. For example, if a 
business wishes that its employees work more efficiently (the grand objective), it may mandate 
that they achieve a certain production rate in a day or that they take regular breaks because it is 
found they tire. This is at the same time a new objective in itself and a means for achieving the 
grand objective of efficiency. 
It must also be noted that for purposes of clarity of explanation I have here limited myself to a 
direct chain of objectives and sub-objectives. The resultant image is something akin to a strict 
Kelsenian pyramid of norms. While there is of course subjugation of objectives to others, with 
higher-order and lower-order objectives – indeed my analysis depends on this thought – there in 
fact exists a more complex relationship between objectives in a legal system. Complete 
descriptive accuracy would therefore require describing objectives as more or less higher order, 
this being a function of the interaction between objectives in all their complexity taken as a 
whole.  
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If, therefore, there is a body of law such as EU law which has a grand objective, a project, it is 
important to understand – for the purposes of understanding and teleological interpretation – not 
only the particular purpose of provisions and sub-sets of provisions, as well as the grand 
objective, but also the complete picture of the interaction and relation between the objectives of 
particular provisions and sub-sets of provisions and grander objectives. My presupposition here 
is that there is coherence between the purposes of provisions of EU law. This would be 
consistent with, and indeed demanded by, systematic interpretation of EU law (as demonstrated 
in section III above). As well as this being a rational reading of a system of law219, specifically in 
the EU context, textual support may be garnered from the programmatic provision that is Article 
7 TFEU which states that ‘[t]he Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, 
taking all of its objectives into account…’. Therefore, one can describe the more or less localised 
or general purposes present in a system of law such as that of the EU as a system of purposes.  
This theoretical perspective provides a basis for describing the system of objectives present in 
the EU project at which EU law is aimed at achieving. With regard to the fundamental freedoms, 
the grand objective is European integration, that being the objective of the body of law as a 
whole. This is served by the fundamental freedoms which aim at allowing individuals space for 
cross-border action and interaction by ensuring them access to other Member States. As such, the 
fundamental freedoms provide for cross-border horizontal integration between private 
individuals from different Member States. A much more refined description of these objectives 
and their relationship will be given in sections IV.A and IV.B below.  
At the most local end of the scale, teleological interpretation in EU law may therefore refers to 
interpretation with reference to the purpose of a particular provision of EU law. At the most 
general end of the scale, it may refer to interpretation with reference to the purpose of European 
integration (section IV. A). Between these two, at an intermediate level of purpose, lie the 
fundamental freedoms which aim at space for individual action and interaction, this being 
ultimately aimed at European integration (section IV.B).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Lenaerts and Gutierrez-Fons argue that ‘[s]ystematic interpretation is based on the premise that the legislator is a 
rational actor’, above n 81, 13 
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A. The purpose and character of the EU and its impact on the interpretation of the Court 
	  
The competence of the EU may have greatly expanded since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. There 
may also have been more and more sub-objectives added to economic integration and economic 
and social progress achieved through liberation of private individuals – such as ‘reinforced 
cohesion and environmental protection’220. However, the grand purpose of European integration 
remains a constant, as is witnessed by the Preamble of the Treaty on European Union which 
starts by declaring ‘a new stage in the process of European integration’ and which finishes by 
resolving ‘to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe’221.  
The grand purpose of European integration can only be fully understood by reference to its 
inception. The Schuman Declaration of 1950 offered hope in the face of the despair of the 
peoples of a continent ravaged by two horrific wars in the first part of the twentieth century. It 
promised ‘a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by 
sanguinary divisions’. This meant the promotion of ‘peaceful achievements’, ‘economic 
development’ and ‘raising living standards’. That was and still remains a vision not lacking in 
adventure.  
However, if this ultimate purpose was to be achieved, it would require, as the Schuman 
Declaration recognised, considerable efforts222. An amalgamation and organisation of these 
efforts amount to a project. In light of this, European integration has a second sense; that of the 
project of European integration. A project that finds its driving force and energy in the idea of 
European integration as a purpose – the ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ and the 
peace and prosperity that this brings.  In this regard, the Schuman Declaration – particularly 
segments here quoted – read, in the words of Weiler, as ‘ceremonial and sermon-like... grand, 
inspiring... [delivering] a compelling vision which has animated generations of European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Preamble  
221 Ibid. 
222 The first line of the Schuman Declaration is a statement that ‘[w]orld peace cannot be safeguarded without the 
making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it’.  
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idealists’223. This grand project with a purpose which promises peace and prosperity gives rise to 
– as was posited by the authors of the Treaty of Rome – a sense of ‘destiny’. 
Two features may be distinguished resultant upon European integration being a project. First, 
such a project requires a great degree of creativity. Creativity has been mandated by the Treaties 
since the Treaty of Rome, and indeed before that the Schuman Declaration, up until the present 
day in the Treaty of Lisbon. With regard to two of the EU’s key sub-objectives, Article 3 TEU 
calls for the Union to ‘establish an internal market... establish an economic and monetary union 
whose currency is the euro’, establishing here being a creative act. The call for creativity does 
not only have the EU institutions (and Member States) as its addressees. Important sub-
objectives such as an internal market, which presupposes individual action and cross-border 
interaction, can be read as, and should be read as (as will be argued in section iii below), a call 
for creativity from private individuals. Such a call for creativity is instructive and programmatic 
for the Court whose role as the interpreter of EU law, as was argued in section I above, is a very 
creative one.  
Second, such a project stretches over time, building upon itself and requires the creative input of 
many. That this was so from the beginning lent systemic support by the Court in Van Gend en 
Loos that took account of the institutional architecture that was in place; ‘the establishment of 
institutions endowed with sovereign rights’.  In this regard, perhaps the most important idea for 
the process of European integration present in the Schuman Declaration is that ‘Europe will not 
be made all at once, or according to a single plan’. The EU project – and thus interpretation of 
EU law – therefore evolves not only in line with the various contexts of the day (as was argued 
in section III above) but also building upon the work that has been done to bring the project to 
fruition thus far. As such, previous acts of integration legitimatise and provide the authority for 
further acts of integration.  
Given that the EU may be described as a project with a purpose, and given that this is posited in 
the Treaties instead of precise substantive rules of law, it is not surprising that it has a particular 
importance in the interpretation of EU law. In the words of Pescatore, ‘[t]he Treaties establishing 
the Communities have been completely moulded by teleology... the Treaties establishing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 J. Weiler, ‘Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of European Integration’ in J. Dickson and P. Eleftheriadis 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (OUP 2012) 146 
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European Communities are based on the concept of objectives to be obtained... In this context 
the teleological method is not simply one method of interpretation among others: far from it. It 
constitutes a method which is particularly suited to the special characteristics of the Treaties 
establishing the Communities’224. Such an orientation towards objectives also explains the often 
under-determined nature of the Treaties. They were, again described Pesactore, as no more than 
‘acts of mutual confidence’225 in achieving the shared objective of European integration. 
As the Treaties are the source of the objectives in EU law, and as the determining of more or less 
general objective requires reading of the provisions of the Treaty on the required scale, in the 
words of Lenaerts and Gutierrez-Fons, ‘teleological interpretation and systematic interpretation 
are often interlinked, since it is by virtue of the latter that the [Court] may identify the objectives 
pursued by the EU law provision in question. Put differently, it is the general scheme of the 
Treaties or, as the case may be, of the act of secondary EU law in question which enables the 
[Court] to clarify the objectives pursued by them’226. There is, as described above, a system of 
purposes that corresponds to the system of rules that makes up the body of EU law.  
Given the creativity that teleological interpretation inspires, and given its pre-eminence in the 
body of law of a project and purpose, it is no surprise that teleological interpretive techniques 
form the foundation of many key landmark and foundational decisions of the Court. The 
resultant creativity present takes the Court beyond the interpretation of individual provisions of 
EU law into the territory of creation of new doctrines. A project and a purpose provides a strong 
reason for the creation of a constitutional architecture, a reason that does not exist in a body of 
law that does not relate to such a project and purpose, such as the national law of a particular 
Member State. No more is this so than with direct effect227 and primacy228 of EU law.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 P. Pesactore, ‘Les objectifs de la Communauté européenne comme principe d’interprétation dans la jurisprudence 
de la Cour de Justice’, (Bruylant, 1972) 326-328; Tridimas similarly describes the Treaties as ‘imbued by telelology’ 
in ‘The Court of Justice and judicial activism’ (1996) 21 ELR 199, 205 
225 Pescatore, above n 18, 19 
226 Lenaerts and Gutierez-Fons, above n 81, 25 
227 The Court stated in Van Gend en Loos that ‘[t]he objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common 
market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty 
is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states’. The internal 
market is now not the only sub-objective that is present in the project of European integration; however as will be 
demonstrated in section B below, it remains a very important one.  
228The Court in Costa v ENEL stated that ‘[b]y creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own 
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, 
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Moreover, as I argued in section I.B above, despite the rule of law being a sub-objective in its 
own rights – a value that binds the European polity – observance of the rule of law and making 
sure that there are no gaps in judicial protection often go hand in hand with integration and 
creation of an internal market, the former providing for the effective realisation of the latter as it 
enables individuals to enforce the system of rights that has established integration and the 
internal market. To be clear, the conception of the rule of law used to make this point in section 
I.B is formalist, law being described as an instrument used to carry out a task. In the words of 
Weiler, ‘… political messianic projects by their very nature go hand in hand with a formalist, 
self-referential concept of the rule of law… [t]ransnational legality helps prevent ‘free riding’ 
and provides stability and continuity…’229. As was argued in section I.A above, just as ‘a knife is 
not a knife unless it has some ability to cut’230, EU law must provide a clear space and regime of 
action for its subjects if it is to contribute to integration.  
That said, this formal conception of the rule of law gives rise to at least one substantive principle 
– effective judicial protection – and indeed a fundamental right consecrated in Article 47 of the 
Charter – the right to an effective remedy. Through this sub-objective, teleology has continued 
beyond foundational doctrines to the steady creation of remedies by the Court (or more 
accurately requiring Member State courts to create remedies). Such protection is a ‘necessary 
corollary’ explained in Brasserie du Pêcheur231 of a system of rights which are directly effective. 
The Court required creation of interim relief against the Crown in the UK in Factortame232, 
Member State liability to pay compensation for breach of EU law in Francovich233, the 
application of that liability to the conduct of courts of last instance in Köbler234, relief against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to 
the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus 
created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves. 
229 Weiler, above n 223, 150-151; Weiler argues that there is a ‘structural and conceptual continuity’ in the messianic 
projects of the EU and National Socialism and notes the latter was achieved through, and with full respect for, the 
‘rule of law’ – albeit that the ‘European integration project is as noble as National Socialism was vile’.   
230 Raz, above n 26, 225 
231 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I-1131, paragraph 22 
232 Case C-213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I-2466 
233 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci and ors [1991] ECR I-5403 
234 Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10290 
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other individuals in the context of competition law in Courage v Crehan235, and interim relief 
against other individuals in Mohamed Aziz236.   
 
B. The purpose and character of the fundamental freedoms and Citizenship of the Union: 
integration through securing the conditions for private autonomy 
	  
In terms of the system of purposes present in the EU legal system, and the Treaty scheme in 
particular, securing the conditions for private autonomy, the objective of the fundamental 
freedoms and Citizenship, is a purpose aimed at the grand objective of European integration. 
Together with efficiency, this may be said to be the purpose of the internal market – the 
fundamental freedoms and competition provisions – in general.  
Creation of the internal market – creation of the conditions for the autonomy that it promotes – is 
a – if not still the – central sub-objective of the EU integration project. It was certainly the first 
objective – in Van Gend end Loos it was named as the objective of the EC Treaty237. It can no 
longer be said that it is the only sub-objective and thus sole ‘meta-teleology’238. Article 2 TEU 
lists others such as human dignity and freedom. There is also now the Citizenship chapter which 
is no more than a close cousin to the internal market provisions. However, in Opinion 1/91 the 
Court cited it as the preeminent objective of the EEC Treaty239. Moreover, in Karren Murphy the 
Court schematically analysed ‘completion of the internal market’ as ‘the fundamental aim of the 
Treaty’240. As such, completion of the internal market is conceptualized as a sub-objective in the 
European project around which other sub-objectives in the Treaty revolve or to which they are 
subjugated.  
How the fundamental freedoms aim at autonomy is therefore crucial to an explanation of the 
system of objectives that is contained in the EU legal order, on which the most crucial set of 
interpretive techniques of the Court – those of a teleological nature – are based.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 Case C-453/99 Courage v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6314 
236 Mohamed Aziz, above n 51 
237 Van Gend en Loos, above n 4, 12 
238 Poiares Maduro, above n 206 
239 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6099 
240 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Karren Murphy [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 115 
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The explanation of how autonomy achieves integration may be taken in three stages. First, 
autonomy is itself an ideal, independent of any subjugation to the rationale of integration (section 
i). Indeed, an ideal for which the fundamental freedoms and Citizenship secure the conditions 
(section ii). That said, being part of a system of purposes, securing the conditions of private 
autonomy is also done in such a way as to achieve the overarching ideal of European integration 
(section iii).  
As well as being descriptively accurate of the fundamental freedoms, there are two further 
methodological reasons why focussing on individual action through the ideal of autonomy is the 
right starting point for describing the system of purposes present in EU law. First, it is 
concordant with the insights of anthropology which would lead to a conclusion that the legal 
rights a person has – and the legal regime he is subjected to – have a great effect on his 
constitution and thus the constitution of the society of which he is part. Second, and similarly, 
behavioural science has emphasised the importance of social systems such as the EU legal 
system in providing ‘the basis for the variety of forms of human action found in modern society 
and, more generally, for the coordination of complex social relations’241 such as is necessarily the 
case in an integration project.    
	  
i. The ideal of autonomy  
	  
The ideal of autonomy is based on individuals deciding for themselves what course of action to 
take. It is the mechanism by which individuals self-create and shape their own future. It also 
provides a means through which economic efficiency may be achieved. As will be described in 
section iii below, both are crucial for achieving European integration.  
A core objective of the Union is according to Article 3 TEU ‘to promote... the well-being of its 
peoples’. Autonomy acts as a particular conception of the well-being of people; more specifically 
of individuals. Therefore, the autonomy of individuals is, as well as being the objective of the 
fundamental freedom and Citizenship, a means to achieve the well-being of the peoples of the 
Member States of the Union.  
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Casting the fundamental freedoms and Citizenship as an instrument for the promotion of 
individual autonomy is by no means new. However, doing so with the aid of a theoretical 
framework will hopefully add definition to how the fundamental freedoms and Citizenship do so. 
The ideal of autonomy has been clearly stated by Raz242. His conception can be used – and 
adapted to take account of autonomy being the chief mechanism to achieve economic efficiency 
– to provide a theoretical framework to describe the method and importance of the fundamental 
freedoms and Citizenship securing the conditions for private autonomy and how private 
autonomy achieves European integration: 
i) The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should make 
their own lives. The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own life. 
ii) An autonomous person’s well-being consists in the successful pursuit of self-chosen 
goals, projects, and relationships. 
iii) In order to live this ideal, a person requires appropriate mental abilities, an adequate 
range of options of which they are informed and independence (the conditions for 
autonomy).  
iv) As the governing idea of autonomy is self-authorship, our duties towards others are 
for the most part to secure for them the conditions for autonomy. 
v) Securing the conditions for autonomy means securing the conditions for undistorted 
competition and thus economic efficiency.   
To be clear, autonomy is only an ideal in an autonomy-supporting environment, paradigmatically 
a market economy. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that it is the only way a person may 
prosper in such an environment, where there is, for example, a great emphasis on the need to 
adapt to change. To declare that securing the conditions for autonomy means securing the 
conditions for undistorted competition brings the analysis full circle. The argument I develop in 
this section is to an extent skewed towards the ideal of autonomy. The importance for economic 
efficiency of private persons deciding for themselves what course of action to take has already 
been well developed by economic theory and applied in the context of EU law243. In reality, the 
market economy, and the economic efficiency that it is designed to engender, and the ideal of 
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autonomy are co-existent. The fundamental freedoms – as well as contributing to the European 
integration project through economic efficiency – provide for integration through creating the 
conditions for autonomy.  
The ideal of autonomy may be objected to. It could be seen as an ideal where individuals are 
atomised and only self-interested. How could that be a model for European integration which 
would seem to imply a degree of (molecular) bonding, if not to a whole, Europeans at least 
bonding with each other? It is important to head off this criticism at an early stage. The ideal of 
autonomy is an ideal of self-creation, but it is also one that emphasises that value is created 
through the successful pursuit of goals, projects and relationships. Goals and projects in a market 
economy where there is a degree of specialisation will almost inevitably involve cooperation 
with others. These create other-orientated reasons for action, as well as reasons for action that 
benefit the individual as part of a collective. Relationships by their nature create other-orientated 
reasons for action. What is more, the ideal of autonomy requires that one consider the conditions 
for autonomy of others. It is of course true that one can choose, for example, a life of quiet 
reflection. That would indeed be compatible with the ideal of autonomy. However, for others, 
autonomy provides a platform for an increased space for and range of action; for increased 
interaction.  
 
ii. The fundamental freedoms and Citizenship securing the conditions for autonomy  
	  
With regard to an account as to how the fundamental freedoms secure the conditions for 
autonomy, the starting point must be the autonomy-constituting actions for which conditions are 
secured. The fundamental freedoms are aimed at the economic life of persons – natural, workers 
and consumers etc. and legal, companies. The free movement provisions – Articles 34, 45, 49, 56 
and 63 TFEU – prohibit restrictions on the free movement of goods, services, persons (workers 
and establishment) and capital respectively. A non-economic freedom – the free movement and 
residence of EU citizens, protected by Article 21 TFEU, is modelled on these economic 
freedoms and provide for movement and residence of individuals in Member States other than 
their Member State of origin. One may query the inclusion of companies as autonomy-capable 
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agents given that they are not, when thought of as a legal identity, people244. However, they are a 
collective vehicle through which their shareholders and stakeholders – including their employees 
– live autonomous lives. Moreover, as a key constituent of the economic make-up, companies 
taking decisions for themselves is a key contributor to economic efficiency, the co-existent and 
corollary of autonomy.  
The core instrument in the economic life of a person to freely give effect to their goals, projects 
and relationships is the contract. In the words of Brownsword, ‘[p]aradigmatically, contract law 
is a licence for self-governance. It is not simply that the parties may make their own trades; more 
significantly, it is that they may... set their own terms of trade’245. Contracts facilitate ‘special 
relationships with others; special, because contracts provide a reason for one party to treat the 
other’s interests as superior to all others’ interests in relation to the contract’s subject matter’246. 
Legal provisions such as the fundamental freedoms aim at providing the conditions for economic 
activity, notably cross-border economic activity. This is as the sale and purchase of goods and 
services and the arrangement of labour and capital take place via contracts. Conversely, in the 
words of Davies, ‘[a]ny restriction on free movement – understood to mean cross-border 
economic activity – is therefore a restriction on the formation of contracts between domestic and 
foreign economic actors’247. If, therefore, the fundamental freedoms protect the conditions for 
free formation of contracts, they aim at the conditions for persons to be economically 
autonomous.  
They do so. Let us recall the conditions for autonomy: the appropriate mental abilities, an 
adequate range of options of which they are informed and independence. There is nothing that 
the fundamental freedoms can do about the mental abilities of a person to lead an autonomous 
life. However, what mainly they can and do is increase a person’s range of options. The 
fundamental freedoms are also intolerant of the actions of some that reduce the independence of 
others. 
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With regard to an adequate range in options, what is important is variety. A choice between one 
hundred options all the same is no choice at all. Such a choice does not allow for a degree of 
self-authorship as a person’s choice between these hundred options all the same has no material 
impact upon the course that will be taken.  
The core way that the fundamental freedoms provide for an increase in the variety of options is 
by banning national measures (mainly the measure of Member States) which discriminate against, 
or cause an obstacle for, good, services, persons and capital from other Member States. More 
precisely, measures that impinge on private person concluding contracts with persons from other 
Member States in a way that would not impinge on concluding contracts with others in that 
Member State. The ban is far-reaching. For example, in the context of free movement of goods, 
the Court stated in Dassonville that it extends to an measures ‘which are capable of hindering, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade’248. Such measures across 
the freedoms include outright national prohibitions, quotas, product standards, advertising and 
labelling requirements, professional qualifications, and minimum capital ratios, to name but a 
few.  
It of course includes discrete contracts, typically contacts of sale. With regard to contracts of sale, 
the increase in the variety of options available is usually a one-sided affair. There is for the buyer 
an increase in the variety of goods or services. For the seller, there is (usually) only an increase 
in profit, or efficiency consequent upon an economy of scale, available – although new markets 
may be conceived of as adding to his variety of options. Both are important for the vision of a 
prosperous Europe. And indeed can be indirectly autonomy enhancing in providing the resources 
to sell new goods and services. There is also increased competition driving efficiency. However, 
the immediate increase in the conditions for autonomy is for the buyer – the consumer. So, in the 
seminal case Cassis de Dijon249, a German law which required minimum alcohol content had the 
factual effect that a good freely available in France – cassis – could not be sold in Germany. 
Such a measure was contrary to Article 34 TFEU, the free movement of goods. The result is that 
the German consumer has the option to enjoy a Kir Royale, if he so wishes, as well as other 
alcohol products available on the German market.  
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There is no point in having an adequate range of options unless a person knows about them or 
can inform themselves about them. This is reflected in the Court’s preference for information 
rules over outright prohibitions. In Cassis de Dijon, the Court made use of proportionality to 
hold the mandatory fixing of alcohol contents was not essential for consumer protection ‘since it 
is a simple matter to ensure that suitable information is conveyed to the purchaser by requiring 
the display of an indication of origin and of the alcohol content on the packaging of the 
product’250. Information rules, therefore, not only increase the variety of options as they provide 
an alternative to not having a certain product on the market for example, but also inform the 
chooser that he has that variety of options. The choice between mandatory rules on the one hand 
and information rules on the other is therefore doubly stark. In the words of Grundmann, 
‘information primarily serves the aim of assisting parties in making decisions autonomously, 
while mandatory substantive rules prescribe a certain solution paternalistically and heteronymous 
order’251. 
This crucial role of information in providing for the conditions for autonomy, and the Court’s 
premium on providing the conditions for autonomy, is put into sharp relief when a person is in a 
position where it is not possible to access information as to their options. This is particularly the 
case when coupled with other autonomy-reducing factors such as vulnerability (see below). In A-
Punkt Schmuckhandels, the Court held a ban on home jewellery parties in Austria may be 
justified and proportionate when taking into account ‘the specific features associated with the 
sale of silver jewellery in private homes, in particular the potentially higher risk of the consumer 
being cheated due to a lack of information, the impossibility of comparing prices or the provision 
of insufficient safeguards as regards the authenticity of that jewellery’252.    
Such an example also shows the intolerance of the fundamental freedoms for the abuse of 
dominant positions by private persons resultant, for example, on informational asymmetries. If 
autonomy is an ideal for all persons, there exists a duty to foster the conditions for autonomy for 
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others. Such a reading of the fundamental freedoms is supported by a schematic interpretation of 
the Treaty as a whole. It would be inconsistent for the competition provisions on one hand to 
curb the abuse of dominant positions while the fundamental freedoms on the other freely 
promote it.   
An available variety of options implies the presence of both short-term and long-term options. If 
a person is to self-create through the pursuit of goals, projects and relationships they must be 
able to do so in all areas. The presence of long-term options is particularly important for 
providing the conditions for individuals to lead an autonomous life. Of course, if a person finds it 
satisfying, they can have a goal to not plan, to take every day as it comes. However, a life of self-
chosen goals, projects and relationships implies options spreading out over time. It also implies 
the possibility of creating your own value in the form of successfully reaching goals or 
completing project or building ties and bonds in relationships.   
It is particularly the free movement of persons and capital provisions which provide for an 
increase in long-term options. These provisions tend to cover more long-term and pervasive 
options such as to employment. The seriousness with which the free movement provisions – 
specifically in this instance Article 45 TFEU the free movement of workers – take the 
maintenance of pervasive options is demonstrated by the fact that it not only finds in its material 
scope measures unfriendly to entering into employment contracts in the first place, such as the 
law in Commission v. Italy253 which provided that private security work could be carried out only 
by Italian security firms employing Italian nationals, but also during the employment relationship. 
Regulation 492/11, implementing the free movement of workers, provides for equal treatment 
with national workers for migrant workers in respect of the terms and conditions of employment 
(Article 7(1)), social advantages, and tax advantages (Article 7(2)).  One of the most long-term 
and pervasive options for a company is in which law it is constituted. Article 49 TFEU freedom 
of establishment provides for companies a broad freedom as to choice of law254. Despite a degree 
of EU harmonisation, company law varies significantly from Member State to Member State. 
Therefore, allowing companies a broad freedom of choice of law not only increases the 
pervasiveness of options available but also the variety. Providing private parties with a greater of 
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variety of options in terms of choice of laws also permeates the Court’s reasoning with regard to 
the core economic instrument for autonomy, the contract. As will be elaborated on below, the 
Court in Alsthom Atlantique255 refused to hold an Article of the French Civil Code – i.e. a 
national contract law – to be infringement of Article 34 TFEU partly because ‘the parties to an 
international contract of sale are generally free to determine the law applicable to their 
contractual relations and can avoid being subject to French law’256.  
Options that one cannot feasibly take are not options at all. Therefore, providing for an adequate 
range options implies providing a person with the conditions that make the exercise of an option 
feasible. The Citizenship jurisprudence and secondary legislation demonstrate an understanding 
and implementation of this, particularly with regard to granting family members of EU citizens 
derivative rights. Recital 5 of the Preamble to the codifying Directive 2004/38/EC states, for 
example, that ‘[t]he right of all Union citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of 
Member States should, if it is to be exercised under objective conditions of freedom and dignity, 
be also granted to their family members, irrespective of nationality’257.  
Widening the range of contractual options for persons across the Member States is of course 
value creating qua the contract itself providing a new important reason for action. However, the 
increased range of contractual options represents the facilitation of valuable option. For a 
company this could be access to more efficient machinery or more highly skilled employees. For 
a worker it is likely to be the opportunity of a more prosperous life. The free movement of 
workers demonstrates a particularly strong linkage between the role autonomy has for creating 
efficiency and prosperity for all and the well-being of the particular person concerned. In the 
words of Richard Plender, ‘…the articles in the founding treaty which provide for the free 
movement of labour were conceived in economic terms. The authors of the Spaak Report wrote 
of the need to make rational use of the “factors of production” in the Member States, and 
identified those factors as capital and manpower. They contemplated that the programme to 
establish freedom of movement would stimulate an increase in the volume of migration between 
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the territories of the Members’258. However, this was accompanied from an early stage by an 
emphasis on the benefits it would bring the European individual who was a factor of production. 
In the preamble to Regulation 1612/68 EC on freedom of movement of workers within the 
Community, it is stated that the ‘…the mobility of labour within the [Union] must be one of the 
means by which the worker is guaranteed the possibility of improving her living and working 
conditions and promoting his social advancement, while helping to satisfy the requirements of 
the economies of the Member States’. 
The logic of providing individuals with valuable economic options and preventing the undue 
interference in the cross-border autonomy of others finds potent expression in the case law of the 
Court concerning the horizontal direct effect of the fundamental freedoms. As Davies points 
out259, third-party interference in the contractual relations of others provides a neat conceptual 
explanation of when the Court will apply the fundamental freedoms to individuals and when it 
will not.  
This focus on contractual relations also emphasises the importance of there being two 
contracting parties. In Viking, it is not only the contractual freedom of the relocating company 
that is being affected but also that of the potential Estonian workers who would be employed in 
the event of relocation. The ideal of autonomy requires the Court to pay equal concern to the 
autonomy of individuals from all parts of the Union – those from the Scandinavian social model 
who already share in the wealth created by the internal market and those from new Eastern 
countries who are by-and-large yet to. As Micklitz260 has emphasised, individuals must have a 
fair and realistic chance to participate in the internal market, or in philosophical conceptual terms, 
justice in autonomy. In such terms, there is at least an argument in favour of this most criticised 
of judgments of the Court.  
As autonomy is aimed at successful or valuable goals, projects and relationships, it does not 
require the presence of repugnant options261. Autonomy describes a way of being and as such 
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does not exist independent of the values with which the autonomous person interacts262. 
Therefore, the fundamental freedoms permitting Member States to remove repugnant options 
through derogations contained in the Treaty and justifications added by the Court263, particularly 
where there is a fundamental rights violation, is entirely consistent with underlying objective of 
providing the conditions for autonomy. No better is this demonstrated than in Omega 
Spielhallen264 which concerned a decision by the Bonn Police Authority to ban Omega, a 
German company using British equipment, from running a laserdome where, through the use of 
laser guns fired at fixed sensory tags attached to players’ jackets, it was possible to ‘play at 
killing’. In finding the restriction on free movement to be justified, the Court noted that ‘… the 
Community legal order undeniably strives to ensure the respect for human dignity as a general 
principle of law’ and that ‘… in Germany, the principle of respect for human dignity has a 
particular status as an independent fundamental right’265.  
The fundamental freedoms also aim at independence. A person is not in a position to self-create 
if he is coerced or manipulated into his choices. The fact that contracts are designed to enable 
economic autonomy explains why in the common law, for example, choices to enter into 
contracts which result from duress, misrepresentation, and undue influence may void or make 
voidable a contract. The fundamental freedoms also operate on an autonomy supporting logic 
when they are tolerant of Member State action specifically targeted at protecting independence 
and therefore the conditions for autonomy. In Buet266, which concerned a French prohibition on 
the doorstep selling of adult education materials, the Court was hostile to manipulation. In 
finding the measure to be justified and proportionate, the Court pointed out that ‘there is a 
greater risk of an ill-considered purchase when the canvassing is for enrolment for a course of 
instruction or the sale of educational material. The potential purchaser often belongs to a 
category of people who, for one reason or another, are behind with their education and are 
seeking to catch up. That makes them particularly vulnerable when faced with salesmen of 
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educational material who attempt to persuade them that if they use that material they will have 
better employment prospects’267. Likewise in A-Punkt Schmuckhandels, the Court noted ‘the 
greater psychological pressure to buy’268 where jewellery sales are organised in a private setting.  
If the fundamental freedoms were economic autonomy supporting, that is to say they support 
private parties exercising their economic autonomy through contractual formation, one would not 
expect the interference of the fundamental freedoms with national measures that enable private 
parties to exercise their economic autonomy, that is to say national civil rules, specifically 
national contract rules. In Alsthom Atlantique269 the national civil rule in question was Article 
1643 of the French Code Civil which states that ‘the vendor shall be liable for any latent defects, 
even if he unaware of those defects, unless he stipulates that he shall not be liable’. This is a 
default rule for when parties do not apportion risk for latent defects in contracts of sale. In CMC 
Motorradcenter270, the rule in question was the fact that in German law a fiduciary relationship 
between contracting parties arises from the beginning of negotiations, this entailing a duty to 
communicate information determinative of the decision of the party. In neither case did the Court 
find there to be an infringement of Article 34 TFEU. These rules applied without distinction and 
that was good enough for the Court. As Weatherill and Micklitz point out, these judgements 
demonstrate a ‘clear reluctance by the Court to intervene in national civil measures by reference 
to primary [Union] rules… The Court is obviously not willing to understand national civil rules 
as barriers-to-trade’271.  
	  
iii. The ideal of autonomy as a mode of integration  
	  
Options which involve individuals in other Member States constitute the increased variety of 
options for which the fundamental freedoms and Citizenship provides. It is not the fact these 
other individuals are situated in other Member States which per se constitutes the increase in 
variety. Rather, it the fact there is great diversity across the Member States. Presuming that at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Ibid. paragraph 13 
268 Case C-441/04 A-Punkt Schmukhandels GmbH v Claudia Schmidt [2006] ECR I-2093, paragraph 29 
269Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique [1990] ECR I-108 
270 Case C-93/92 CMC Motorradcenter [1993] ECR I-5010 
271 H-W. Micklitz and S. Weatherill, European Economic Law (Ashgate 1994) 370 
	   77 
least some individuals in one Member State prefer options involving individuals in other 
Member States272 (those first individuals presenting an increased variety of options for those 
other individuals), there are individuals who are taking action and exercising their autonomy 
which involves individuals in other Member States reciprocally taking action and exercising their 
autonomy. There is, in short, intra-Union cross-border interaction between individuals. This 
model enlists the ‘inherent capacities for social or collective action, including a bias towards pro-
social behaviour, which derive from some of the original conditions of human evolution’273 as 
has been noticed by behavioural and social scientists. If the ideal of autonomy is that of 
individual self-creation, the ideal of integration through autonomy is that of collective self-
creation by individuals through acting on taking the cross-border options available to them. The 
ideal is one of a Europe – the project of integration – authored by individuals in their shared 
goals, projects and relationships. In terms of the Schuman Declaration, Europe is not being made 
not according to one single plan, rather according to the plans and creative efforts of the many 
millions that choose to take their cross-border options.  
Concretely, individuals create Europe through their cross-border economic, personal, social and 
political interactions. With regard to economic interaction, the prime mode of interaction is as 
explained above contractual. Contracts of sale – mainly of goods and services – may very well 
lead to fulfilment of goals, the successful realisation of projects and meaningful relationships 
between individuals in varying Member States. This is particularly the case when the cross-
border contract is for the transfer of ownership, notably in a company. However, it is mainly 
through longer-term contracts that these individuals successfully embark on their economic goals, 
projects and relationships.  
For workers, the relationships with individuals from other Member States contained in the 
project of their employment include those with their employers and with other workers. Workers 
again are more than a mere factor of product, instead autonomous and relational individuals. This 
may include the formation of pan-European trade unions to assert their interests.  
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For firms, organisation and collaboration through contract or company law amounts to shared 
projects that can reduce transaction costs274. This is such an instance where the nexus between 
efficiency and autonomy is close. European regulated networks already exist for telecoms, 
electricity, gas and transport275 (which are essential material factors for multi-Member State 
autonomous European individuals). There however does not exist the same degree of 
collaboration among SMEs even though they are earmarked by the Commission as central for 
economic growth276. It does however recognise the importance of their relationships in this 
respect. Their long-lasting economically efficient interactions will require regulatory support in 
order to secure this key expansion in integration277.  
This vision for the economic integration of the Union even finds traction with the Commission. 
Magnanimously it concedes that ‘the EU institutions cannot deliver an effective single market on 
their own. We need to rethink how to involve relevant actors… [in order to provide a more] 
decentralised and network-based [internal market]’278. 
With regard to personal and social interaction, it is clear that the economic interactions engender 
personal interaction. Many of cross-border contracts, and particularly the longer term contracts, 
involve interactions far from the contractual paradigm of arm’s length dealing. There is the 
development of pan-European social networks and other social structures. This allows the 
development of trust and confidence in business relationships279. A core insight of Granoveter, 
writing from a sociological perspective, was that the ‘anonymous market of neoclassical models 
is virtually nonexistent in economic life and that transactions of all kinds are rife with… social 
connections…. [for example] many firms, small and large, are linked by interlocking directorates 
so that relationships among directors of firms are many and densely knit’280. Applying this 
analysis to the European business context means economic interactions knitting together 
business Europe personally as well as economically.  
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European Contract Law (Ashgate 2013) 
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There is of course the opportunity for individuals (as natural persons) to form cross-border 
families and friendships. The result is ties and bonds with different Member States of the Union. 
These individuals with pan-European identities, themselves microcosms of integration, find their 
main protection in the Citizenship provisions. How crucial this is to integration is recognised by 
the Court in its firm protection of these ties and consequent identities in the ‘name cases’. In 
Garcia Avello281, a Spanish father (Carlos Garcia Avello) and a Belgian mother (Isabelle Weber) 
applied to the Belgian authorities to have their dual nationality children’s surnames change to 
Garcia Weber, reflecting the Spanish pattern for surnames which compromise the first element of 
the father’s surname (Garcia) followed by the mother’s maiden name (Weber). The Belgian 
authorities refused.  The Court looked to the principle of non-discrimination. As the Garcia 
Avello children were in a different situation to Belgian nationals who only held that nationality, 
holding joint Spanish and Belgian nationality, they had a ‘right to be treated in a manner 
different to that in which persons having only Belgian nationality are treated’282. Here, therefore, 
the principle of non-discrimination cab be seen to act not so much as a source for the conditions 
for autonomy and cross-border interaction, but rather protecting the integration resultant upon 
that exercise of that autonomy and cross-border interaction283.  
With regard to political interaction, the conditions for autonomy and the creation of a European 
political space have provided the conditions for integration through transnational mobilization. 
The free movement of people has facilitated the movement of actors and transnational advocacy 
networks, empowering them through the creation of mobilization structures. As the social 
scientist Montoya explains, ‘the formation of transnational advocacy networks links actors in 
civil societies, states, and international organizations in a way that can multiply the opportunities 
for marginalized groups to mobilize’284. An acute example of how the free movement of people, 
and the power of according the European individual the basic of status of being an EU citizen, 
has facilitated the movement of actors and transnational advocacy structures is post-accession 
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German-Polish LGBT activism. LGBT activism was already well established in Germany, 
particularly in Berlin near to Poland, which has comparatively greater LGBT visibility, 
awareness of LGBT issues, and more positive LGBT attitudes285. ‘Poland emerged from 
transition having had little discourse on LGBT issues prior to beginning the EU accession 
process… [i]n contrast, the 1960s sexual revolution and the 1980s HIV/AIDS epidemic 
politicized LGBT issues much earlier throughout the Federal Republic of Germany’286. For 
example, the highly publicised and illegal Parada Równości (Equality March) in 2005, as well as 
being significantly comprised of expatriate Poles and German citizens, was organised by a 
transnational group of activists organising events from both Poland and neighbouring Germany, 
many of the expatriate Poles using resources made available to them in Berlin287. 
It is also of interest that during these marches that the protesters identified Europe with the ideal 
of autonomy (supporting my argument in section ii above). As an ideal of self-creation it 
supports many versions of the good life and requires value pluralism. Such an ideal requires 
individuals to be tolerant of others so as to not to interfere in their autonomous self-creation. In 
this regard, the protesters on the Warsaw Equality March wore t-shirts which read ‘Europa = 
Tolerancja’. After all, Article 2 TEU describes Europe as a society where pluralism and tolerance 
prevails288.   
All in all, as Commandé argues, ‘business associations, social networks, technical standards 
bodies, scientific association, together with long term family relations and more transient 
transactions such as package holidays are building blocks of the transnational civil society in 
Europe’289. 
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What emerges from the cross-border interaction of individuals are a great diversity of economic, 
personal, social and political goals, projects and relationships. As part of self-creation, the value 
of integration centred on the interactions of autonomous individuals is the great scope for 
experimentation, ingenuity and the vitality that new combinations bring. Out of the very many 
cross-border visions, some survive and some do not. The goals, projects and relationships fuse 
continually with the most excellent ones remaining. There is after all a certain degree of 
competition between the visions, particularly when it comes to the economic sphere.  
The successful variations feed back into the EU system of law – through the preliminary 
reference procedure – that helped to provide for the interactions in the first place. This forms the 
facts and societal context for new interpretations of the Court to make more precise and/or 
evolve the law of EU so as to provide the conditions for autonomy in this new setting and allow 
further autonomous cross-border interaction and consequent integration. Each new interpretation 
provides a ‘social memory’290 of what providing the conditions for autonomy requires. This is a 
model that reflects and draws upon the insight of behavioural and social scientists that 
‘individual agency and social structures are mutually interdependent’291. EU law evolves in the 
manner described above in sections I.B and III.A, but in response to changing conditions often 
brought about the autonomy enhancing nature of EU law. Adapting what has been described by 
Deakin, ‘[t]he EU legal system organizes the information it receives in such a way to formulate 
rules which are linked to each other [slightly moulding the system of objectives such as what for 
example the freedom of establishment would require in a particular case] and to the high-level 
conceptual abstraction [providing for cross-border action, interaction and therefore integration] 
which inform them’.  
As such the teleological interpretation of the Court through providing the conditions of 
autonomy in changing social, political, economic, cultural etc. contexts is necessarily 
conceptually and structurally linked to contextual interpretation. The financial crisis played 
heavily on the mind of the Court in Mohamed Aziz292 - a judgement I used to demonstrate socio-
economic context above – in it creating a remedy of interim relief so that Mr Aziz had use of the 
substantive EU rules designed to protect his autonomy. Moreover, as LGBT individuals become 
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more and more accepted in Europe, this provides a societal context in which the Court protects 
more and more this also valuable way of life.  
The very broad and easily-triggered Dassonville formula as a definition of ‘measure of 
equivalent effect’ in the context of Article 34 TFEU led to the Court in the Sunday Trading 
cases293 to hold that national rules prohibiting retailers from opening their premises on Sunday 
were trade barriers for the purpose of Article 34 TFEU. The Court in Keck and Mithouard took 
note of the information being fed back through the preliminary reference mechanism that Article 
34 TFEU was being used to challenge ‘any rules whose effect is to limit their commercial 
freedom even where such rules are not aimed at products from other Member States’294. This was 
of course insolent of the Court given that it was its broad Dassonville formula and confirmation 
of its broadness in cases such as the Sunday Trading cases which gave those traders the authority 
to challenge those rules. However, the Court does show a recognition that its decisions on Article 
34 TFEU were not aimed precisely enough at the goal of providing the conditions of autonomy 
for individuals, in this the case option to enter into a new market. How does a measure aim at 
that if it, as the Court recognized in Keck and Mithouard, affects all relevant traders – those from 
other Member States and those from the home Member State –  in the same manner in law and in 
fact as was the case in the Sunday Trading cases? Remember, as was explained in section ii 
above, all that providing the conditions for autonomy requires is that the individual has a fair and 
realistic chance to participate in the internal market through the taking of varied options, such as 
for a business the marketing of its product on the market of other Member State than its own.  
The success of a variations and whether the Court chooses to protect them is determined through 
the system of rights and purposes which constitutes EU law depends in a large part on their 
coherence with other social systems, as well as the EU legal order which protects the autonomy 
of the individual. As such, providing for the conditions of autonomy is not the only evolutionary 
force which weighs on the Court while it aims at achieving the conditions for autonomy. The 
acceptance of EU rules in the Members States – its fit with other social systems such as national 
political systems – is something that the Court has in mind when it communicates its vision to 
the Member States, for the ultimate effectiveness of EU law depends on its acceptance.   
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Ruiz Zambrano295  concerned a failed asylum seeker from Colombia living in Belgium, but 
benefiting from non-refoulement protection due to the civil war in Colombia. He and his 
Colombian wife had two children who were Belgian nationals. The Belgian authorities stopped 
him from working on finding out he did not possess a work permit. They also denied him 
unemployment benefit and refused him a residence permit. However, prima facie EU law could 
not offer any protection as it was a wholly internal situation. The EU law orthodox is that it only 
applies where there is cross-border element, thus clearly and directly providing for an increase in 
cross-border options for the individual. Textually, and concerning Citizenship, this would be 
reliance on the wording of Article 21 TFEU. The Court in Rottman296 introduced a new legal 
gene which was followed in Ruiz Zambrano297 – the reliance on Article 20 TFEU which contains 
a selection of Citizenship rights beyond free movement rights, to hold that even in the absence of 
a cross-border element that Article ‘precludes national measures which have the effect of 
depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred 
by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union’298. The conduct of the Belgian authorities would 
in fact prevent such enjoyment by the Zambrano children, the Court concluded, as the parent 
would be forced to return to Colombia and the children ‘would [also] have to leave the territory 
of the Union in order to accompany their parents’299.  This was not an experimentation which 
fitted well with social systems present in the national political orders. The interior ministries of 
Member States saw it as ‘driving a coach and horses’ through national immigration and social 
security policy300. In light of this pressure from national political systems, the Court has appeared 
to confine Ruiz Zambrano to the facts of the case. In McCarthy301 for example the Court refused 
to extend to interpret the principle as applying to a British woman who wished to secure the 
entry into the United Kingdom of her Jamaican husband. In the terms of Esser’s hermeneutics, 
the Court oscillated its collective interpretive eye between the rule established in Ruiz Zambrano, 
the facts of the case, and the strength of view of national political orders. It found the draw 
towards strength of view of national political orders too overwhelming. Switching back to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Ruiz Zambrano, above n 50 
296 Case C-135/08 Rottman [2010] ECR I-1449 
297 Ruiz Zambrano, above n 50, paragraphs 42-43 
298 Ibid. 
299 Ibid. paragraph 44 
300 I. Solanke, ‘Using the Citizen to Bring the Refugee in’ (2012) 75 MLR 101, 108-110 
301 McCarthy, above n 195; see also Dereci, Iida and O & S also limiting the Ruiz Zambrano genetic mutation, 
above n 50 et seq. xx-xx 
	   84 
terms evolutionary theory, it thus appears that this environmental factor prevented the 
development of this legal-genetic variation.          
In the economic sphere, the vision bears resemblance to that of Collins who does not see 
European private law built through top-down codification but bottom-up, by and through the 
economic and social actors as well as their organisations302. At a more general level, it is an 
argument against the existence of finalité in the Court’s vision. In this regard, Walker has opined 
for an EU ‘where the emphasis is on an inclusive, secular and adjustable process of political 
community-building rather than on the handing down and entrenchment of a sacred text’303. My 
argument in this section has been, in Walker’s terms, that entrenchment of the sacred text is an 
inclusive, secular and adjustable process of community-building.  
In this regard, the interactions are as such supported by the private enforcement by individuals of 
EU law rights (bestowed upon them direct effect). Individuals vindicate worthwhile options for 
themselves and others, for themselves and others to interact and integrate. In the conception of 
autonomy driven integration built here, the quotation from Lecourt should read ‘when an 
individual appears before the judge [of a national court] to defend rights she derived from the 
Treaties, that individual does not only act in her own interest, she immediately becomes an 
auxiliary agent of other individuals’304.  
 
iv. Integration through autonomous interaction: no sense of the ‘whole’?  
	  
The model of European integration built here, while not atomising, in focussing on projects, 
goals, and relationships of individuals, emphasises the importance of the microcosm over the 
macrocosm. Geremek famously opined ‘[w]e have Europe. Now we must make Europeans’305. 
That is not quite right. We have Europe. We also have Europeans. However, and understandably 
so, their loyalties lie with their cross-border projects and relationships, rather than the 
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background consideration of the EU which facilitates those cross-border projects and 
relationships. These Europeans who exercise their autonomy are virtuous. Weiler has portrayed 
the European individual as individualistic and value-orientated, who thus lacks in virtue306. The 
successful European individual requires loyalty to his projects, determination in his goals, 
kindness in his relationships and bravery in leaving his home when taking a cross-border option. 
It is true the experience of the European individual requires of him particular virtues. However, 
lacking in virtue he is not. The autonomous person is a virtuous person, and the European 
individual being an autonomous person is therefore virtuous.   
Perhaps the model of integration will change and the meta-teleology will switch from integration 
through autonomy to integration through some other sub-objective that will bind Europeans not 
only to each other but also to the European purpose and project. There were hints at this in Ruiz 
Zambrano. The Court argued that the Zambrano children would have to ‘leave the territory of the 
Union’307. This represented a discursive shift from framing issues in terms of the territories of 
Member States308. However, as was described above, this experimental attempt of the Court was 
snuffed out by environmental factors. More promising is the building of pan-European 
collectives of individuals as described by Commandé and Collins. They perhaps have the 
capacity to engender a sense of grander community that seems to currently lack in the context of 
the autonomy ideal. European individuals may in time become attached to the autonomy ideal 
and thus through it attached to Europe as whole – it is after all possible to think of it promoting a 
private law society. Whatever the case may be, through the system of objectives that it guards309, 
through its creative force, and through its oversight of the evolution of integration – that is to say 
its interpretation – the Court will play a central role.     
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